Who gains from saving nature
Ledger 1 : 33 — For each dollar financing nature-based solutions in 2023, about $33 financed activities harmful to nature. (UNEP)
Cases / Agriculture, livestock and food · Uzbekistan · 2017–2026

Uzbek cotton boycott ends forced labour

Nature's voice · report
No measurement of the harm done to me here is on record.
Did nature suffer? Not measured.
People
  • At least 21 people died.
    Karakalpakstan, July 2022 (Human Rights Watch).
What the record lacks: 2 none on record · 2 insufficient · 1 not measured · 3 disputed See the gaps

A global boycott of Uzbek cotton was lifted in March 2022 after the ILO reported that the state-organised harvest mobilisation had ended. Later monitoring reports recorded continuing local coercion, pressure on farmers, and land and purchasing control concentrated in private cotton clusters.

about 4% (2020 harvest) to about 1% (2021 harvest)Share of cotton pickers counted as forced labour by ILO monitoring
Figures from ILO monitoring as reported in the record; the ILO measured pickers, not farmers.

Status As of February 2026: HRW and the Uzbek Forum published a report recording coercion of cotton and wheat farmers; the boycott has not been reinstated in the sources reviewed.

What?
A decade-long global boycott of Uzbek cotton ended in March 2022 after the ILO reported that the state-organised harvest mobilisation had ended; later reports record continued local coercion and pressure on farmers. ILO
Where?
Uzbekistan: cotton districts; Karakalpakstan for the July 2022 deaths.
When?
Boycott lifted March 2022; monitoring reports 2020-2026. ILO
Who?
Gained
  • Cluster owners — Land without tender and a regional buying monopoly; 73% of the harvest in 2019 (RFE/RL).
  • Indorama Agro — 54,000 ha; loans of USD 60 m (IFC), USD 70 m (EBRD), USD 15 m (ADB); repaid early in January 2025, ending its safeguard obligations.
  • Uzbek central government — Removal from the US list, EU trade preference, EU enhanced partnership agreement, USD 800 m from the World Bank, 'role model' from the ILO. ILO
  • Foreign buyers — A Korean trading firm's Uzbek unit reported net profit rising from 4.9 billion to 37 billion won after the Xinjiang ban (Chosun Biz via BHRRC); Disney made Uzbekistan an approved source country. ILO
Lost
  • Farmers — Price fell from about 8,000 to about 6,000 som/kg in 2024; about 30,000 underpaid for 2022 cotton.
  • Taxpayers and state banks — Cluster losses of 6 trillion som in 2022; 3 + 3 trillion som relief; 377 billion som penalty write-off; USD 2.2 billion bank debt.
Harmed
  • Farmers and cotton workers — Quotas, planting orders, threats to take land, beatings and detention (HRW and Uzbek Forum, 2026); local forced labour recorded each year 2022-2025. Human Rights Watch and Uzbek Forum
  • People in Karakalpakstan — At least 21 died in July 2022; victims awaited justice in July 2025 (HRW).
Why?
The ILO reported that systemic forced labour in the harvest had ended and the Cotton Campaign ended the boycott call on that basis; the Cotton Campaign said local coercion continued. Cotton Campaign
How?
ILO monitoring (11,000 interviews in 2021) of pickers; the end of the central mobilisation; land and purchasing handed to clusters; trade preferences and loans followed. ILO
6 of 6 questions answered from the record

What happened

The record, in order.

For years the Uzbek state mobilised about 2 million people a year (children, teachers, doctors and students) to pick cotton, according to ILO and Cotton Campaign material. An international boycott campaign against Uzbek cotton ran for roughly a decade. The ILO's monitoring of the 2020 harvest counted about 4% of pickers as forced; for the 2021 harvest, on the basis of 11,000 interviews, it reported that 99% of pickers were voluntary and coercion had fallen to about 1%.

On 1 March 2022 the ILO announced that Uzbek cotton was free from systemic child labour and forced labour. On 10 March 2022 the Cotton Campaign ended its call for a global boycott and 331 brands withdrew their boycott pledge, while stating that local coercion continued and that monitoring groups could not register. Third-party monitoring ended in May 2022. The US Department of Labor lifted its restrictions on Uzbek cotton on 29 September 2022, according to Kun.uz.

The ILO did not define 'systemic', and its measurement covered pickers rather than farmers. Its 2024 presentation gave a number of complaints (283, of which 35 were open) rather than a percentage. Critics Lasslett and Gstrein had earlier objected to interviews held under supervision, and the ILO defended its methods. The Uzbek Forum and the Cotton Campaign reported local forced labour for each following year: district targets, empty contracts, land seizure and police violence in 2022; collection of money from public employees in 23 districts in 2023; extra contracts that lowered the price mid-season in 2024; and a daily 4% target, sanctions on district heads and bank and library staff in the fields in 2025. The Ministry confirmed forced labour itself in 2025, punishing 8 officials for 74 violations (Anhor.uz). In February 2026 Human Rights Watch and the Uzbek Forum published a report that applied the ILO's forced-labour indicators to farmers for the first time, recording quotas, planting orders, threats to take land, beatings and detention.

Land and purchasing in the sector passed to 'clusters', private cotton-textile companies that hold land and a regional buying monopoly. Clusters took 73% of the harvest in 2019; there were 96 clusters on 907,783 ha in 2021 and 134 on more than 1 million ha in 2022. A peer-reviewed assessment found that the buying monopoly continued, that farmers had no alternative outlet and that change was 'at best moderate'. A presidential adviser told clusters in October 2023 to collect farmers' cotton without asking them. Indorama Agro, farming 54,000 ha, took loans of USD 60 million from the IFC, USD 70 million from the EBRD and USD 15 million from the ADB, and repaid early in January 2025, ending its safeguard obligations.

The record also lists costs and rewards. Clusters lost 6 trillion som in 2022 and received two relief packages of 3 trillion som each; a penalty write-off of 377 billion som followed in 2025, and the sector's bank debt stood at USD 2.2 billion. The farm-gate price fell from about 8,000 to about 6,000 som per kg in 2024, and about 30,000 farmers were underpaid for 2022 cotton. On the other side, the EU granted a trade preference worth EUR 28 million in customs savings in 2022, the World Bank approved USD 800 million in October 2025, and the ILO described Uzbekistan as a 'role model' in July 2024. At least 21 people died in Karakalpakstan in July 2022; Human Rights Watch reported in July 2025 that victims were still awaiting justice, and the EU partnership agreement was initialled days after the events.

  1. 2019Clusters take 73% of the cotton harvest (RFE/RL)
  2. 2020ILO monitoring counts about 4% of pickers as forced
  3. 2021ILO monitoring of the harvest (11,000 interviews): about 1% coercion; 96 clusters on 907,783 ha; EU trade preference granted in April; IFC invests in Indorama Agro (May)
  4. 2022ILO declares Uzbek cotton free from systemic child labour and forced labour (1 Mar); Cotton Campaign ends boycott call (10 Mar); third-party monitoring ends (May); at least 21 die in Karakalpakstan (Jul); US Department of Labor lifts restrictions (29 Sep); 134 clusters on more than 1 million ha
  5. 2023Uzbek Forum reports collection from public employees in 23 districts; presidential adviser tells clusters to collect cotton without asking farmers (Oct)
  6. 2024Farm-gate price falls to about 6,000 som/kg; ILO presents 2024 monitoring with 283 complaints, 35 open
  7. 2025Indorama Agro repays loans early (Jan); Ministry punishes 8 officials for 74 violations; World Bank approves USD 800 million (Oct)
  8. 2026Human Rights Watch and Uzbek Forum report on abuse of cotton and wheat farmers (16 Feb)

What was said

Claims, in the words of those who made them.

“Uzbek cotton is free from systemic child labour and forced labour”

ILO news item title · 1 March 2022 · ILO

“Cotton Campaign Ends its Call for a Global Boycott”

“Lifting of the boycott will create millions of new jobs”

Narbaeva, official statement (title of the statement) · 11 June 2022

“Farmers Have No Freedom”

Where accounts differ

Each party's account, side by side, with its source. The record does not settle these points; it shows them.

Did the boycott end forced labour in Uzbek cotton?
International bodies
ILO

Uzbek cotton is free from systemic child labour and forced labour; 11,000 interviews in 2021; about 1% coercion.

ILO
Communities and civil society
Cotton Campaign

Ended its call for a global boycott; stated that local coercion continues and monitoring groups cannot register.

Cotton Campaign
Communities and civil society
Uzbek Forum

Independent monitoring shows human rights risks remain (November 2022); local forced labour recorded in 2022-2025.

Cotton Campaign / Uzbek Forum
Government and regulators
Uzbek Ministry

Confirmed forced labour itself in 2025: 8 officials punished, 74 violations (Anhor.uz).

Researchers
Lasslett and Gstrein, criticising the ILO method

Interviews held under supervision raise problems of consent and confidentiality; the ILO defended its reporting methods.

Just Style
Did the end of the boycott benefit Uzbek farmers?
Government and regulators
Narbaeva, official statement

Lifting the boycott will create millions of new jobs.

Communities and civil society
Human Rights Watch and Uzbek Forum

Farmers Have No Freedom: quotas, threats to land, beatings and detention; lease terms cut to 30 years.

Human Rights Watch and Uzbek Forum
Researchers
Peer-reviewed study (Babadjanov and Petrick)

The buying monopoly continues, farmers have no alternative sales channel and change is at best moderate.

Government and regulators
Presidential adviser, as reported by Kun.uz

Gave clusters authority to collect farmers' cotton without asking them (October 2023).

Kun.uz

How it looked

What was shown, beside what was recorded.

Shown

  • Uzbek cotton free from systemic child labour and forced labour
    ILO, 1 March 2022 · ILO
  • The boycott ended; lifting it would create millions of new jobs
    Narbaeva, official statement, 11 June 2022
  • Uzbekistan described as a 'role model'; freedom of association and farmers not mentioned in the announcement
    ILO announcement of a new programme with Uzbekistan, 16 July 2024 · ILO
  • Textile employment up from 188,000 (2018) to about 600,000 (2024)
    World Bank, May 2025
  • Uzbekistan made an approved sourcing country for factories registered with Better Work
    Disney, as reported by the ILO, June 2024 · ILO

Recorded

  • ILO monitoring measured pickers only, not farmers; it did not define 'systemic'; third-party monitoring ended in May 2022
  • ILO's 2024 harvest presentation gave no percentage: 283 complaints, 35 open
    ILO
  • Uzbek Forum and Cotton Campaign recorded local forced labour in 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025
    Cotton Campaign / Uzbek Forum
  • The Ministry itself confirmed forced labour in 2025: 8 officials punished, 74 violations
  • Human Rights Watch and the Uzbek Forum applied ILO forced-labour indicators to farmers for the first time in 2026: quotas, planting orders, threats to take land, beatings, detention without trial; land lease terms cut from 49 to 30 years
    Human Rights Watch and Uzbek Forum
  • Clusters: 73% of the harvest in 2019; 96 clusters on 907,783 ha in 2021; 134 on more than 1 million ha in 2022
    Kun.uz
  • A presidential adviser gave clusters authority to collect farmers' cotton without asking them (October 2023)
    Kun.uz
  • The EU trade preference was granted in April 2021, when ILO monitoring for the 2020 harvest still counted about 4% forced labour
  • Independent cooperatives were closed; silk cocoons remain on the US forced-labour list
  • Textile exports were USD 3.2 billion in 2022 and USD 2.5-2.6 billion in 2025; official sources differ and the Presidency reports an increase on 2024; the main buyer is Russia
    Kun.uz

Who gained

Money that reached nature, beside money that stayed elsewhere.

Reached nature or the ground

Not published
No figure published.

Gained elsewhere

Not totalled
Currency: · Window: . All figures cover the same period. * Estimate built from cited figures.

Responses on record

  • ilo (March 2022; 2018): Declared Uzbek cotton free from systemic child labour and forced labour; defended its reporting methods against criticism of its interview approach. · ILO
  • uzbekistan-gov (June 2022; 2025): An official statement said lifting the boycott would create millions of new jobs; the Ministry confirmed forced labour in 2025 and punished 8 officials for 74 violations.
  • ifc (May 2021): Announced an investment in Indorama Agro 'to promote sustainable cotton' (title of its release).

In court and with insurers

Every proceeding and every insurer decision on record.

Lawsuits and rulings

No court case on record. No court has ruled on this case.

Insurers

No insurer decision on record.

What nature saw

Outcomes measured on the ground, and nature's note.

Nature's report opens this page. Below: further outcomes measured on the ground.

Pickers counted as forced (ILO monitoring)
about 4% to about 1%
2020 harvest to 2021 harvest; pickers only, farmers not measured
Cotton clusters
96 to 134
2021 to 2022; 907,783 ha to more than 1 million ha
Third-party monitoring
Ended May 2022
Later figures come from complaint counts and civil-society reports

What we don't know

Undisclosed, unproven, untried: recorded as data.

Nature

  • Not measured Harm to nature: The record holds no measurement of harm to nature.

Accounts

  • Disputed Did the boycott end forced labour in Uzbek cotton?
  • Disputed Did the end of the boycott benefit Uzbek farmers?

Record

  • None on record The ILO did not define 'systemic' forced labour and did not measure farmers; third-party monitoring ended in May 2022, so no equivalent independent measurement of later harvests is on record.
  • None on record The 2024 ILO presentation gave a count of complaints, not a percentage of pickers affected.
  • Disputed Official sources give different textile export figures for 2022-2025.
  • Insufficient Reported but not independently verified: that Senator Murtazo Rakhmatov, who founded the first cluster, was appointed head of the cluster association in December 2020 (Kun.uz, secondary report only); that 22,400 ha were transferred 'overnight' from 475 farmers to his company's cluster (Uzbek Forum).
  • Insufficient Reported but not independently verified: that the number of forced pickers in 2023 was increased by collection from public employees in 23 districts (Ecotextile, secondary report of an Uzbek Forum report).

Did the harm stop?

The state-organised mobilisation of about 2 million pickers ended and ILO monitoring counted about 1% coercion in the 2021 harvest. Third-party monitoring ended in May 2022; later reports record local coercion, pressure on farmers and loss-making clusters supported by state banks.

Who paid?

Farmers, whose price fell and who reported quotas, land threats and detention; state banks and taxpayers, who carried cluster losses of 6 trillion som in 2022 and relief and write-offs; and, per HRW, the victims in Karakalpakstan.

Sources

Voices on record: — Company or project— Government and regulators— Courts✓ Press and investigations✓ Communities and civil society— Researchers✓ International bodies

Press and investigations

Communities and civil society

  2. Joint Statement on Ending the Call for a Global Boycott
    Cotton Campaign and Government of Uzbekistan · n.d.
  4. Will Uzbekistan Finally Solve Forced Labor Through Mechanization?
    Uzbek Forum for Human Rights (via Cotton Campaign) · 2026-01-26

International bodies

Connected cases

Related matters, and cases linked to this one through the same organisations, with the role each played in both.
Terms used on this page

Science and environment

Hectare (ha)
A unit of area equal to 10,000 square metres, about 2.5 acres. 100 hectares make one square kilometre.

Carbon and conservation finance

Voluntary carbon market
Trade in carbon credits bought by choice, mostly by companies, outside legally binding emission schemes.

Bonds and banking

Arranger
The bank that structures and sells a bond or loan deal, usually for a fee.

Law and courts

Land titling
Formal legal recognition of ownership of land.
Similar cases
Agriculture, livestock and food · India · 2021–2024
PepsiCo potato variety registration (India)
Same type: Agriculture, livestock and foodSame regionHarm to nature not measured
Agriculture, livestock and food · India · 2017–2025
Zoetis growth-promoter sales in India and portfolio sale to Phibro
Same type: Agriculture, livestock and foodSame regionHarm to nature not measured
Agriculture, livestock and food · Indonesia · 2020–2025
Indonesia seizure of illegal plantations and transfer to Agrinas Palma
Same type: Agriculture, livestock and foodSame regionHarm to nature not measured
Agriculture, livestock and food · Japan · 2022
Japan 'Kumamoto clam' sales reported at about 120 times the annual Kumamoto catch
Same type: Agriculture, livestock and foodSame regionHarm to nature not measured
Agriculture, livestock and food · Philippines · 2024
Philippine appeals court blocks commercial GM rice and Bt eggplant
Same type: Agriculture, livestock and foodSame regionHarm to nature not measured