Cases / War and military activity · Iran · 2025–2026
Strikes on Iranian oil and gas facilities, June 2025 and March 2026, and damage at Qatar's Ras Laffan
Nature's voice · report
A hillside near the Fajr Jam gas plant lay scorched in the satellite imagery CEOBS analysed in June 2025.
Did nature suffer? Yes. Harm is on record.
Recorded
- After two tankers collided on 17 June 2025, the ADALYNN fire and spill put an 8 km oil slick on my Gulf waters, CEOBS wrote. Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS)
What the record lacks: 2 none on record · 2 not disclosed · 2 not measured · 2 disputed · 1 unclear See the gaps
CEOBS described fires and damage at the Tehran refinery, South Pars Phase 14 and the Fajr Jam gas plant in June 2025. On 18 March 2026 Iranian state media reported strikes on South Pars gas plants at Asaluyeh, and QatarEnergy later estimated a roughly USD 20bn annual revenue loss from damage at Ras Laffan.
Roughly USD 20bn per year estimateQatarEnergy's estimate of annual revenue loss after the March 2026 damage at Ras Laffan
QatarEnergy's estimate (QR72.8bn), reported by Offshore Technology on 20 March 2026; it said repairs would take three to five years.
QatarEnergy's estimate (QR72.8bn), reported by Offshore Technology on 20 March 2026; it said repairs would take three to five years.
Status As of 11 August 2026: Iran's Oil Minister said four damaged refineries were being rebuilt; QatarEnergy's repair estimate is three to five years.
What?
Strikes and fires at Iranian oil and gas facilities in June 2025 and on 18 March 2026, and damage to Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG complex, with QatarEnergy estimating a roughly USD 20bn annual revenue loss. Offshore Technology
Where?
Tehran (Shahr-e Rey) refinery; South Pars Phase 14, Fajr Jam and the Asaluyeh gas treatment plants in Bushehr province, Iran; Ras Laffan Industrial City, Qatar. Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS)
When?
13–24 June 2025 (strikes of 14 June, tanker collision of 17 June); 18–19 March 2026 (Asaluyeh and Ras Laffan); QatarEnergy estimate 20 March 2026. Offshore Technology
Who?
Gained
None on recordLost
- QatarEnergy — Estimated revenue loss of roughly USD 20bn per year; force majeure on some contracts Offshore Technology
- ExxonMobil — Owner of 34% of LNG Train 4 and 30% of Train 6, both damaged Offshore Technology
- Iran's gas sector — Phase 14 production of 12 million m3 halted in June 2025; about 95 million cubic metres of output lost by August 2026, period not stated The National
Harmed
- Hillside at the Fajr Jam gas plant — Scorched vegetation seen in satellite analysis Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS)
- Gulf waters near the ADALYNN — An 8 km oil slick after the 17 June 2025 tanker collision Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS)
Why?
The facilities were struck in the June 2025 war between Israel and Iran and in the war that began on 28 February 2026; parties' accounts of who struck and approved differ. Maritime Executive
How?
Strikes caused fires and damage at gas and refining units; production was halted or taken offline; QatarEnergy declared force majeure and estimated repair at three to five years. Offshore Technology
6 of 6 questions answered from the record
What happened
The record, in order.
In an overview dated 20 June 2025, the Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS) described the environmental consequences of the June 2025 war between Israel and Iran, based only on remote analysis and the existing literature. It wrote that the Tehran (Shahr-e Rey) refinery, with "a refining capacity of 225,000 barrels per day", was attacked on 14 June and that fire was visible on 15 June, and it listed the pollutants typical of major oil fires: "particulate matter, NOx, nitrous acid, carbon monoxide, sulphur dioxide, VOCs such as formaldehyde, and potentially dioxins, furans, hydrocarbons and PAHs". That list is generic and does not report measurements.
At South Pars Phase 14, hit on 14 June, Iranian state media told Reuters that a fire broke out "in one of the four units of Phase 14 of South Pars", halting production of "12 million m3 of gas". CEOBS satellite analysis suggested damage to a processing centre and that two wells to the north "no longer appear to be operational or flaring". At the Fajr Jam gas plant CEOBS saw "scorched vegetation on a nearby hillside and damage to some of the processing infrastructure". On 17 June two tankers collided in the Gulf; the ADALYNN fire and spill "generated an 8 km oil slick", and CEOBS wrote that "It is thought that GPS spoofing linked to electromagnetic warfare may have contributed". Argus Media reported on 18 March 2026 that Phase 14 operations resumed "within two weeks".
On 18 March 2026 Iranian state media said US and Israeli drones struck gas treatment plants in Asaluyeh that process sour gas from phases 3, 4, 5 and 6, damaging four facilities; Asaluyeh governor Eskandar Pasalar said the facilities had "been taken offline" to control and prevent the spread of fire. Maritime Executive reported that Israel struck Asaluyeh, that a US defence official told Axios the strike was approved in advance by the White House, and that President Trump denied prior knowledge. Qatar's foreign ministry called the South Pars attacks "dangerous and irresponsible".
On 18–19 March 2026 Maritime Executive, under the headline "Iran Damages Ras Laffan LNG Terminal", reported damage at Qatar's Ras Laffan complex: QatarEnergy said the complex sustained "significant damage"; the outlet wrote that Pearl GTL was hit and that several LNG facilities suffered "extensive" damage; fires were put out and Qatar's interior ministry said teams were clearing unexploded munitions. QatarEnergy and its chief executive Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi said LNG Trains 4 and 6 (12.8 mtpa) were damaged and export capacity fell by about 17%, estimated the revenue loss at "roughly $20bn (QR72.8bn) per year", said the damage "will take between three to five years to repair" and declared force majeure "for up to five years on some long-term LNG contracts". Train 4 is owned 66% by QatarEnergy and 34% by ExxonMobil; Train 6 is owned 70% by QatarEnergy and 30% by ExxonMobil.
In August 2026 Iran's Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, quoted by The National on 11 August, said Iran lost "about 95 million cubic metres of natural gas output" because of the war, that four damaged refineries were being rebuilt and that "Debris removal, the first stage of the work, has been completed". The article does not say whether the gas figure is per day or a total, and no cost was given.
- 2025Tehran refinery attacked (14 Jun); South Pars Phase 14 hit (14 Jun); tanker collision and ADALYNN spill (17 Jun); CEOBS overview (20 Jun)
- 2026Iranian state media report strikes on Asaluyeh gas plants (18 Mar); QatarEnergy reports damage at Ras Laffan (18–19 Mar) and estimates annual revenue loss (20 Mar); Oil Minister Paknejad on lost gas output (11 Aug)
What was said
Claims, in the words of those who made them.
“At present little information is available on releases from the damaged facilities”
“taking precautions to avoid triggering a nuclear disaster”
“been taken offline”
“dangerous and irresponsible”
“roughly $20bn (QR72.8bn) per year”
“The damage sustained by the LNG facilities will take between three to five years to repair”
“Debris removal, the first stage of the work, has been completed”
Where accounts differ
Each party's account, side by side, with its source. The record does not settle these points; it shows them.
Who struck Asaluyeh on 18 March 2026, and who approved it
Government and regulators
Iranian state media
US and Israeli drones struck gas treatment plants in Asaluyeh.
Argus MediaPress and investigations
Maritime Executive, citing a US defence official via Axios
Israel struck Asaluyeh and the White House approved the strike in advance.
Maritime ExecutiveGovernment and regulators
President Trump
Denied prior knowledge, according to Maritime Executive.
Maritime ExecutiveHow it looked
What was shown, beside what was recorded.
Shown
- A fire broke out in one of the four units of Phase 14 of South Pars, halting production of 12 million m3 of gas.Iranian state media, via Reuters, as cited by CEOBS · Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS)
- US and Israeli drones struck gas treatment plants in Asaluyeh, damaging four facilities.Iranian state media, as reported by Argus Media · Argus Media
Recorded
- CEOBS: the overview is "an initial scoping exercise based only on remote analysis and the existing literature".
- QatarEnergy estimated the revenue loss at roughly USD 20bn (QR72.8bn) per year; LNG Trains 4 and 6 (12.8 mtpa) were damaged and export capacity fell by about 17%.
- Argus Media reported that Phase 14 operations resumed within two weeks.
- Iran's Oil Minister said four damaged refineries were being rebuilt and debris removal had been completed.
Who gained
Money that reached nature, beside money that stayed elsewhere.
Reached nature or the ground
Not published
No figure published.
Gained elsewhere
Not totalled
QatarEnergy's estimated annual revenue loss after the Ras Laffan damage estimate$20bn
QR72.8bn as stated by QatarEnergy.
Currency: USD · Window: per year. All figures cover the same period. * Estimate built from cited figures.
Responses on record
- QatarEnergy (2026-03-20): Said Ras Laffan sustained significant damage, estimated a roughly USD 20bn annual revenue loss and declared force majeure on some long-term LNG contracts. · Offshore Technology
- Government of Qatar (2026-03-18): Foreign ministry called the South Pars attacks "dangerous and irresponsible". · Argus Media
- Government of Israel (2025-06): As quoted by CEOBS in June 2025: "taking precautions to avoid triggering a nuclear disaster". · Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS)
- Government of Iran (2025–2026): State media reported a fire at South Pars Phase 14 in June 2025 and drone strikes on Asaluyeh gas plants on 18 March 2026; the Oil Minister said four refineries were being rebuilt. · The National
In court and with insurers
Every proceeding and every insurer decision on record.
Lawsuits and rulings
No court case on record. No court has ruled on this case.
Insurers
No insurer decision on record.
What nature saw
Outcomes measured on the ground, and nature's note.
Nature's report opens this page. Below: further outcomes measured on the ground.
Oil slick after the ADALYNN collision, 17 June 2025
8 km
CEOBS, 20 June 2025
Gas production halted at South Pars Phase 14
12 million m3
Iranian state media via Reuters, June 2025
QatarEnergy's annual revenue-loss estimate
Roughly USD 20bn
March 2026; repair expected to take three to five years
What we don't know
Undisclosed, unproven, untried: recorded as data.
Accounts
- Disputed Who struck Asaluyeh on 18 March 2026, and who approved it
Record
- Not measured Not measured: no measured emissions data from the June 2025 fires; open-source analysis was "hampered by. disinformation, AI generated content and miscaptioned footage" (CEOBS).
- Not measured Not measured: no emissions, flaring or spill data from either side for March 2026; Maritime Executive cites NASA FIRMS infrared detections without giving values.
- Not disclosed Not disclosed: "Iranian authorities have not disclosed how much production was lost" at Asaluyeh (Argus Media, 18 March 2026).
- Not disclosed Not disclosed: environmental statements by QatarEnergy.
- Unclear Unclear: whether the 95 million cubic metres of lost gas output given by Iran's Oil Minister is per day or a total.
- Disputed Disputed: Iranian state media attributed the 18 March strike on Asaluyeh to US and Israeli drones; Maritime Executive reported that Israel struck; the US defence official's account and President Trump's denial of prior knowledge differ.
- None on record None on record: volumes of fuel burned at the Tehran refinery and a Department of Environment assessment for June 2025.
- None on record None on record: insurance; QatarEnergy declared force majeure on some long-term LNG contracts.
Did the harm stop?
Fires at the Asaluyeh facilities were being controlled on 18 March 2026 and Qatar's fires were put out by 19 March; Phase 14 operations resumed within two weeks of June 2025, according to Argus Media. No emissions data are on record.
Who paid?
None on record. QatarEnergy estimated its own revenue loss; Iran's Oil Minister gave no cost for rebuilding four refineries.
Sources
Voices on record: — Company or project— Government and regulators— Courts✓ Press and investigations✓ Communities and civil society— Researchers
Press and investigations
- Iran says US, Israel hit South Pars gas facilitiesArgus Media · 2026-03-18
- Iran Damages Ras Laffan LNG TerminalMaritime Executive · 2026-03-18
- QatarEnergy estimates $20bn annual loss after Ras Laffan attackOffshore Technology · 2026-03-20
- Iran lost 95 million cubic metres of natural gas output due to warThe National · 2026-08-11
Communities and civil society
- The emerging environmental consequences of the Israel-Iran warConflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS) · 2025-06-20
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