Hoor al-Azim wetland, oil-field development and dikes in Khuzestan
- I was split into seven parts, and platforms ringed by embankments and roads stand in four of my Iranian reservoirs, according to SNN. SNN (Student News Network)
- When wetland area in Khuzestan fell below about 60 km², dust events rose to 20–35, a 2025 study of 2010–2022 found; each 1 km² lost was associated with about 0.03 more PM10 polluted days and 0.05 more PM2.5 polluted days. Yousefi-Kebriya et al., Scientific Reports (NASA MODIS abstract)
- In 2024–2025 I dried and caught fire, and in early May 2025 thousands of hectares burned, according to local media reported by Reuters. Context (Thomson Reuters Foundation)
- In 2025–2026 I was partly refilled in late winter and spring, and the water fell again in summer, according to the Department of Environment. Tehran Times
- Government and regulators Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad (Ahvaz, February 2025): "We are the ones who dried up the wetland, and we are the ones who hurt the people of Khuzestan" (English rendering by Reuters). Business Day (Reuters)
- Communities and civil society Ismail Kahrom, ecologist (to Mehr, July 2021): The Ministry of Petroleum drained parts of the wetland to drill test wells; "they sacrificed water for oil". Iran International
- Government and regulators Former Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh (2015, 2019): Opposed drying Hoor al-Azim for oil extraction, calling a Karun-fields project that would have dried it "a betrayal of future generations"; in 2019 said the ministry would never accept harm to people to produce a few thousand more barrels. SNN (Student News Network)
- Government and regulators Oil Ministry position as summarised by SNN (2022): Denied wanting the wetland dry; would treat the area like an offshore field and build platforms if it were reflooded. SNN (Student News Network)
- Researchers Hossein Hashemi (Lund University) and Kaveh Madani (UNU-INWEH) to Reuters, 2025: Hashemi: "These marshes once acted as natural barriers, trapping fine sediments and maintaining soil moisture"; Madani: "Sand and dust storms and wildfires are examples of the complex problems that are going to require complex solutions". Business Day (Reuters)
- Government and regulators Masoumeh Ebtekar, former head of the Department of Environment (July 2021): Backed statements that the Supreme National Security Council ordered the drying in 2010 over the DoE's objection. Iran International
- Government and regulators Ahmad-Reza Lahijanzadeh, Department of Environment deputy (2021): The decision was tied to Chinese contractors unwilling to use costlier technology; the technology Japanese firms had used at Azadegan and Yadavaran did not require drying. Iran International
- Government and regulators Ahmad Midari, deputy welfare minister (2021): Officials at the time thought drying would create jobs. Iran International
- Government and regulators Oil Ministry (as summarised by SNN, 2022): Denied wanting the wetland dry. SNN (Student News Network)
- Press and investigations Reuters / Thomson Reuters Foundation (May 2025): A 65 km Iranian dike along the border since 2009 divides the marsh. Context (Thomson Reuters Foundation)
- Communities and civil society Iraqi ecologist (Nature Iraq, 2018): A 90 km soil embankment on the Iranian side in 2011 blocked water from that side. Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative
Parts of the Iranian side of the transboundary Hawizeh marshes in Khuzestan were enclosed by dikes and roads around the Azadegan and Yadavaran oil fields. Reuters quoted Iran's oil minister in 2025 as saying "We are the ones who dried up the wetland"; no compensation or restoration budget specific to the wetland is on record.
Hoor al-Azim, the Iranian part of the Hawizeh marshes, as reported by Reuters / Thomson Reuters Foundation on 21 May 2025.
Status As of September 2026: the Department of Environment reported the wetland partly refilled and then falling again; no court case or compensation on record.
- CNPC and Sinopec — Oil development contracts worth about US$2.5 billion (South Azadegan, terminated in 2014) and about US$2 billion (Yadavaran, initial estimate) Energy Daily (AFP)
- NIOC / Iran — Terminated the South Azadegan contract in 2014 with seven of 185 first-phase wells drilled Gulf News (AFP)
- Hoor al-Azim wetland — Area down from about 124,000 ha to 60,650 ha; dried and burned in 2024–2025 Business Day (Reuters)
- People of Khuzestan — About 1,000 a day hospitalised in May 2025 with heart and respiratory illness linked to sand and dust storms (Reuters) Context (Thomson Reuters Foundation)
- Indigenous residents — About 90% had left, an activist estimated in 2017 Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative
What happened
Hoor al-Azim is the Iranian part of the transboundary Hawizeh marshes in Khuzestan province, on the Iran–Iraq border, fed mainly by the Karkheh river and the Tigris. SNN reported in March 2022 that the wetland was split into seven parts: five reservoirs in Iran, one zone between the Iranian and Iraqi border dikes, and one Iraqi part. From the mid-2000s Iran built oil facilities in its part, and reservoirs 1, 3, 4 and 5 contain platforms ringed by embankments and roads. Reuters / Thomson Reuters Foundation reported a 65 km Iranian dike along the border since 2009; an Iraqi ecologist (Nature Iraq, 2018) reported a 90 km soil embankment on the Iranian side in 2011.
The oil development rested on contracts with Chinese state companies. Sinopec signed the Yadavaran contract in Tehran on 9 December 2007, with an initial cost estimate of about US$2 billion according to Oil Minister Gholam Hossein Nozari (AFP). CNPC signed a US$2.5 billion South Azadegan contract in late 2009; seven of 185 first-phase wells had been drilled when the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) terminated it on 29 April 2014, citing "non-compliance" (AFP via Gulf News).
In July 2021 ecologist Ismail Kahrom told Mehr: "The Ministry of Petroleum has drained parts of the Hur al-Azim wetland to drill test wells." Former Department of Environment (DoE) head Masoumeh Ebtekar backed statements that the Supreme National Security Council had ordered the drying in 2010 over the DoE's objection. DoE deputy Ahmad-Reza Lahijanzadeh said the decision was tied to Chinese contractors unwilling to use costlier technology, and that the technology Japanese firms had used at Azadegan and Yadavaran did not require drying. Deputy welfare minister Ahmad Midari said officials at the time thought drying would create jobs. No published document of the 2010 decision is on record.
In February 2025 Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said in Ahvaz, in Reuters' English rendering of his Persian remarks: "We are the ones who dried up the wetland, and we are the ones who hurt the people of Khuzestan." Former Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh had said on Earth Day 2015 that he opposed a Karun-fields project that would have dried the wetland, calling it "a betrayal of future generations"; in 2022 SNN summarised the Oil Ministry's position as denying that it wanted the wetland dry. Floods refilled the wetland in 2019. In 2024–2025 it dried and caught fire; in early May 2025 thousands of hectares burned, local media reported. A late-winter and spring refill in 2025–2026 was followed by a fall in summer, the DoE said in September 2026.
A 2025 study in Scientific Reports of wetland shrinkage and dust in Khuzestan (2010–2022) found a correlation of −0.85 between wetland area and dust-event frequency. Reuters reported about 1,000 people a day hospitalised in Khuzestan in May 2025 with heart and respiratory illness linked to sand and dust storms. No court case, fine or compensation award concerning the drying has been reported.
- 2007Sinopec–Iran Yadavaran contract signed in Tehran (9 December); estimated cost about US$2 billion
- 2009CNPC South Azadegan contract signed (late 2009); 65 km Iranian border dike dividing the marsh since 2009 (Reuters)
- 2010According to officials, the Supreme National Security Council ordered the drying
- 2014NIOC terminates the CNPC South Azadegan contract (29 April)
- 2015Former Oil Minister Zanganeh says he opposes drying the wetland for oil (Earth Day, 21 April)
- 2019Floods refill the wetland
- 2021Kahrom, Ebtekar and Lahijanzadeh statements on the drying (July–August)
- 2025Oil Minister Paknejad's statement in Ahvaz (February); fire burns thousands of hectares (early May)
- 2026DoE: partly refilled in late winter and spring, then fell again in summer (September)
What was said
“We are the ones who dried up the wetland, and we are the ones who hurt the people of Khuzestan”
“The Ministry of Petroleum has drained parts of the Hur al-Azim wetland to drill test wells”
“In fact, they sacrificed water for oil.”
“a betrayal of future generations”
“We would never accept harm to people to produce a few thousand more barrels”
“These marshes once acted as natural barriers, trapping fine sediments and maintaining soil moisture”
Where accounts differ
Each party's account, side by side, with its source. The record does not settle these points; it shows them.
"We are the ones who dried up the wetland, and we are the ones who hurt the people of Khuzestan" (English rendering by Reuters).
Business Day (Reuters)The Ministry of Petroleum drained parts of the wetland to drill test wells; "they sacrificed water for oil".
Iran InternationalOpposed drying Hoor al-Azim for oil extraction, calling a Karun-fields project that would have dried it "a betrayal of future generations"; in 2019 said the ministry would never accept harm to people to produce a few thousand more barrels.
SNN (Student News Network)Denied wanting the wetland dry; would treat the area like an offshore field and build platforms if it were reflooded.
SNN (Student News Network)Hashemi: "These marshes once acted as natural barriers, trapping fine sediments and maintaining soil moisture"; Madani: "Sand and dust storms and wildfires are examples of the complex problems that are going to require complex solutions".
Business Day (Reuters)Backed statements that the Supreme National Security Council ordered the drying in 2010 over the DoE's objection.
Iran InternationalThe decision was tied to Chinese contractors unwilling to use costlier technology; the technology Japanese firms had used at Azadegan and Yadavaran did not require drying.
Iran InternationalOfficials at the time thought drying would create jobs.
Iran InternationalDenied wanting the wetland dry.
SNN (Student News Network)A 65 km Iranian dike along the border since 2009 divides the marsh.
Context (Thomson Reuters Foundation)A 90 km soil embankment on the Iranian side in 2011 blocked water from that side.
Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity InitiativeHow it looked
Shown
- The Ministry would treat the area like an offshore field and build platforms if it were reflooded; it denied wanting the wetland dryOil Ministry position, as summarised by SNN · SNN (Student News Network)
- Opposed drying Hoor al-Azim for oil extractionBijan Zanganeh, then Oil Minister, Earth Day 2015 · SNN (Student News Network)
- Constant inflow, delivery of water rights and transboundary cooperation are key to stop the wetland becoming "a dust hotspot and fuel for wildfire"Department of Environment (Ahmadreza Lahijanzadeh), September 2026 · Tehran Times
Recorded
- Wetland area about 124,000 ha in the early 1970s and 60,650 ha in 2025 (Shahid Beheshti University data, via Reuters)
- Seven parts: five reservoirs in Iran, one zone between the border dikes and one Iraqi part; platforms ringed by embankments and roads in reservoirs 1, 3, 4 and 5
- Border dike: 65 km along the border since 2009 (Reuters / Thomson Reuters Foundation); 90 km soil embankment on the Iranian side in 2011 (Nature Iraq, 2018)
- CNPC South Azadegan: seven of 185 first-phase wells drilled when NIOC terminated the US$2.5 billion contract on 29 April 2014
- Flood damage to oil facilities in 2019 estimated at about 1,000 billion toman by Oil Minister Zanganeh
- About 1,000 people a day hospitalised in Khuzestan in May 2025 with heart and respiratory illness linked to sand and dust storms (Reuters)
- About 90% of indigenous residents of Hoor al-Azim had left (activist estimate, 2017)
Who gained
Reached nature or the ground
Gained elsewhere
Responses on record
- iran-ministry-of-petroleum (February 2025): Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad: "We are the ones who dried up the wetland, and we are the ones who hurt the people of Khuzestan." · Business Day (Reuters)
- iran-ministry-of-petroleum (2022): Denied wanting the wetland dry; would treat the area like an offshore field and build platforms if it were reflooded. · SNN (Student News Network)
- nioc (29 April 2014): Terminated the CNPC South Azadegan contract for "non-compliance" (managing director Rokneddin Javadi). · Gulf News (AFP)
- iran-doe (September 2026): Constant inflow, delivery of water rights and transboundary cooperation are key to stop the wetland becoming "a dust hotspot and fuel for wildfire". · Tehran Times
In court and with insurers
Lawsuits and rulings
Insurers
What nature saw
Nature's report opens this page. Below: further outcomes measured on the ground.
What we don't know
Nature
Court
- None on record No court case on record.
Record
- None on record None on record: a court case, fine or compensation award concerning the drying of Hoor al-Azim.
- None on record None on record: a wetland-specific restoration budget, compensation scheme or payment by an oil company.
- None on record None on record: a published document of the 2010 Supreme National Security Council decision; the claim rests on officials' statements.
- Disputed Figures differ: the border dike is 65 km long since 2009 (Reuters / Thomson Reuters Foundation) and a 90 km embankment in 2011 (Nature Iraq).
- Not disclosed Not disclosed: which body counted the roughly 1,000 daily hospitalisations in Khuzestan in May 2025.
- Disputed Disputed: the oil sector's share of the loss (see disputes).
Did the harm stop?
The wetland dried and caught fire in 2024–2025; the Department of Environment said in September 2026 that it had partly refilled in late winter and spring and then fallen again in summer.
Who paid?
The wetland, and the people of Khuzestan exposed to dust. No wetland-specific restoration budget, compensation scheme or oil-company payment is on record.
Sources
Press and investigations
- Why did Hoor al-Azim dry up? Are China or the Oil Ministry involved? (Persian)SNN (Student News Network) · 2022-03-26
- Ismail Kahrom: Ministry of Oil dries up parts of Hur al-Azim wetland for drillingIran International · 2021-07-23
- Iran's ex-environment chief says Khuzestan wetlands dried for oilIran International · 2021-08-01
- How dried-out wetlands on the Iran-Iraq border threaten the regionContext (Thomson Reuters Foundation) · 2025-05-21
- Degradation of wetlands on the Iran/Iraq border a recipe for disasterBusiness Day (Reuters) · 2025-05-21
- Iran, China finalise two billion dollar oil contractEnergy Daily (AFP) · 2007-12-09
- Iran oil ministry cancels $2.5b Chinese contractGulf News (AFP) · 2014
- Zanganeh: I oppose drying Hoor al-Azim for oil extraction (Persian)SNN (Student News Network) · 2015-04-21
- What is the truth about Hoor al-Azim? (Persian; via Mardomsalari)Aftab News · 2019-04-14
- Upcoming precipitation expected to help revive Hour al-Azim wetlandTehran Times · 2026-09-19
Communities and civil society
- Iraq and Iran's Hawizeh Marshes: Threats and Opportunities (Laith Ali Al-Obeidi, Nature Iraq)Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative · 2018-08-20
- The Border Wetlands of Iran-Iraq (Toon Bijnens, Save the Tigris)Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative · 2017-07-02
Researchers
- Wetland shrinking and dust pollution in Khuzestan IranYousefi-Kebriya et al., Scientific Reports (NASA MODIS abstract) · 2025
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