Lake Faguibine feeder-channel dredging and dune stabilisation: the OMVF and its restoration support project (PARF), Mali
- 3.91 billion XOF were budgeted in my name. The measurements of what reached me differ. Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- Sand filled my feeder channels, and the 2016 evaluation of the Malian restoration project says clearing all 120 km of channels remains a challenge. Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- In 2017 UNEP wrote that there seemed to be no recovery of my lake in its 2016 image. UN Environment, Science Division
- In 2021 the ICRC described cracked ground where I was, with sand burying houses in Bilal Bancor, Bintagoungou and Mbouna. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC Newsroom)
- Government and regulators Final evaluation of the PARF first phase, prepared for the OMVF (July 2016): Channel deepening "a favorisé. l'alimentation précoce en eau de certains lacs" (Tassakane, Kondi, Marigot de Goundam, Kamaïna); the flood began in March in 2014-2015 against early September in 2011-2012; regularising the whole system remains a challenge. Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- International bodies World Food Programme (December 2009): The lake, dry three years earlier, "has again become an area of fertile land around a system of lakes". World Food Programme (via ReliefWeb)
- International bodies UN Environment Foresight Brief (August 2017): "there seems to be no recovery as can be seen in the 2016 image". UN Environment, Science Division
- Researchers Groupe URD for AFD (2020): Niger inflows remain too weak since the complete drying of 1983; recent levels allowed only occasional flooding of the south-east; a 2019 flood reached land long used for grazing. Groupe URD for the Agence Française de Développement
- Communities and civil society ICRC and residents (September 2021): Describes a cracked lake bed; a farmer says the little water reaching the pond serves only to grow enough to survive. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC Newsroom)
- Government and regulators Final evaluation prepared for the OMVF (2016): The drying since the mid-1970s was caused by climate change and by human interventions: deforestation, barriers on the feeding channels and fishing dikes inside the channels, locally and in the upper Niger basin. Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- Government and regulators Direction Nationale de l'Hydraulique et de l'Energie (studies of 1987 and 1995), as reported by Groupe URD: Rejected any role for the Sélingué and Markala dams in the fall in Niger flows. Groupe URD for the Agence Française de Développement
- Communities and civil society Populations of the Faguibine, as reported by Groupe URD: The Markala and Sélingué dams are often blamed. Groupe URD for the Agence Française de Développement
- International bodies UN Environment Foresight Brief (2017): The Sélingué dam has already reduced the water flooding the Inner Niger Delta; the Fomi Dam and planned irrigation schemes are expected to reduce it further. UN Environment, Science Division
- Researchers Groupe URD (2020): Declining rainfall since 1968 and, apparently, upstream irrigation; no study has evaluated the real impact of the pumping; sanding of the channels is also attributed to wind erosion and to gardens made at the banks. Groupe URD for the Agence Française de Développement
Mali created the Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF) in 2006 to maintain the feeder channels of the Lake Faguibine system. Its first-phase restoration support project (PARF), run from 2011 to 2016 with Norway as financial partner, had a budget of 3,911,500,000 FCFA; the final evaluation reports 431,360 m3 excavated against 404,000 m3 planned and 279 ha protected against sand, while later sources describe the lake as dry or only occasionally flooded.
Figure from the final evaluation of July 2016: 2,316,500,000 FCFA (OMVF fund) and 1,595,000,000 FCFA (UNDP-managed fund). The shares contributed by Norway and by Mali are not stated.
Status As of the final evaluation of July 2016, the first phase of PARF was extended to the end of 2016; no second-phase document was found, and later sources (2017 to 2021) describe the lake as dry or only occasionally flooded.
- Beneficiary producers and market gardeners in the PARF zone — Seeds, training and small equipment; women are 80% of market-garden beneficiaries according to the evaluation Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- Young people in the riverside villages — 3,000 young people were mobilised for the channel deepening and carcass collection, which the evaluation says created jobs Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- Farmers, herders and fishers of the Faguibine — Loss of the lake's farming, grazing and fishing; sown areas of millet, sorghum and maize fell in 2009-2010 to 2015-2016 Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- Lake Faguibine system — Flooded surface area about 1 000 km2 in the late 19th century and some 90 km2 in 2010; no recovery seen in the 2016 image according to UNEP African Journal of Aquatic Science 41(1): 109-117 (Hamerlynck, Moulaye Zeine, Mutua, Mukhwana, Yéna)
What happened
Mali's own works on the Faguibine channels predate the OMVF. Groupe URD's account for the French Development Agency (AFD) lists a Programme de mise en valeur du système Faguibine financed by Norway through the UN Sudano-Sahelian Office in 1986 to 1990, in two phases of two years each, which carried out manual and mechanical earthworks and mechanical and biological fixation, a decision in 2000 by communes financed by the Tombouctou-West local development programme to invest part of their intercommunal funds in re-watering the Faguibine, an execution study launched in 2002 by the Regional Assembly of Tombouctou, and a feasibility study in 2005 that led to the OMVF. Law n°06-011 of 27 January 2006 then created the Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), with works and maintenance of the channels and hydraulic structures among its tasks. The World Food Programme (WFP) reported in December 2009 that in 2006 the government had tried to reopen the channels with heavy machinery, "But the machines got bogged down in the sand", and that local authorities and WFP had then set up a food-for-work project in which local people cleared the channels by hand; no budget or tonnage was stated.
The Projet d'Appui à la Restauration du Système Faguibine (PARF) was designed for one year, 2011 to 2012, and was extended to the end of 2016. The final evaluation of its first phase, dated July 2016 and prepared for the OMVF, gives its total cost as 3,911,500,000 FCFA, of which 2,316,500,000 FCFA was the OMVF fund and 1,595,000,000 FCFA the fund managed by UNDP. It describes the project as the result of a partnership between the Government of the Republic of Mali and Norway, with the Ministry of Agriculture as owner and the OMVF as executing body, and says the Norwegian foreign ministry set up the two funds; it thanks Norway as financial partner and the Malian state for financial support but does not state each party's share. The intervention zone covered 20 communes with 174,258 inhabitants (1998 census). The evaluation reports spending of 2,314,049,317 FCFA from the OMVF fund (99%) and 1,315,518,258 FCFA from the UNDP-managed fund (82%) and, citing audit reports and project staff, no deviation of expenditure during the implementation of the project.
The evaluation reports that 431,360 m3 were excavated from the channels (Tassakane, Kondi, Marigot de Goundam and Kamaïna) against 404,000 m3 planned (107%), by high-intensity manual labour, and that no deepening was carried out in 2012 because of the political and security crisis. It states that clearing all 120 km of channels in the zone remains a challenge needing large means. According to data from the rural engineering service quoted in the evaluation, the flood began in early September in 2011-2012 and in March in 2014-2015. On the protection of the environment, 279 ha were protected by dune stabilisation, tree planting and bank fixing against an indicator of 50% of the threatened area (realisation estimated at 60%). Of 30 machines a study judged necessary, PARF had four (13.33%), parked at Sotuba-Bamako because of insecurity, and the maintenance workshop built by the project was not functional. The evaluation rated the project's overall implementation at 60% (summary) and at 55.83% of indicators with 92.79% of resources mobilised (efficiency section), and said its weak monitoring system did not allow a real estimate of indicator achievement.
On livelihoods, the evaluation reported that 35 of 42 producers interviewed had enlarged their cultivated area by a quarter or half a hectare, and beneficiaries said the lean season had shortened from 5 to 3 months. Regional Directorate of Agriculture statistics quoted in the same report show sown areas between 2009-2010 and 2015-2016 falling for millet (5,524 to 557 ha), sorghum (22,760 to 3,500 ha) and maize (15,900 to 185 ha) and rising for rice (9,672 to 12,114 ha); the evaluation attributed the falls to the security crisis and poor rainfall in the last two years. WFP's December 2009 report had said the lake "has again become an area of fertile land around a system of lakes".
Later sources describe a lake that is dry or only partly flooded. UNEP's August 2017 brief said there seemed to be no recovery of the lake in its 2016 image. Groupe URD, in a study for AFD with fieldwork from November 2019 to February 2020, wrote that since the complete drying of the lake in 1983 Niger inflows had remained too weak, that recent levels had allowed only occasional flooding of the south-east, and that a flood in 2019 reached land long used for grazing and revived land claims; AFD was considering support to the system in 2020, with no amount stated. The ICRC reported in September 2021 that it had fixed ten hectares of dunes at Bilal Bancor with more than a hundred people from vulnerable households paid daily for about twenty days, and described houses buried by sand in Bilal Bancor, Bintagoungou and Mbouna. No document on a second phase of PARF, and no OMVF report after 2016, were found in the sources reviewed.
- 1986Programme de mise en valeur du système Faguibine financed by Norway via the UN Sudano-Sahelian Office (1986 to 1990): earthworks and mechanical and biological fixation (Groupe URD)
- 2002Regional Assembly of Tombouctou launches an execution study on deepening and protecting the channels (carried out by Sadiconsult); feasibility study follows in 2005
- 2006Law n°06-011 of 27 January creates the OMVF; the government begins trying to reopen the channels with heavy machinery, which gets bogged down in the sand, and local authorities then set up food-for-work with WFP (start year not stated)
- 2009WFP reports (14 December) that local people cleared the channels with food assistance and that the area had again become fertile land around a system of lakes
- 2011PARF first phase begins (designed for 2011-2012); 2012: no channel deepening because of the political and security crisis
- 2014Flood begins in March in 2014-2015, against early September in 2011-2012, according to the rural engineering service (final evaluation)
- 2016Final evaluation of PARF first phase (July): 431,360 m3 excavated, 279 ha protected, project extended to end of 2016
- 2017UNEP Foresight Brief (August): no recovery seen in the 2016 image
- 2019Flood reaches land long used for grazing and revives land claims (Groupe URD); workshop in Bamako 25 to 28 November for AFD's study
- 2021ICRC (28 September) fixes ten hectares of dunes at Bilal Bancor and describes buried houses and a closed school
What was said
“But the machines got bogged down in the sand.”
“The soil around the lake is very fertile and spongy; the water can spread for 5 kilometres.”
“The vegetation you see now is thanks to water because if we had not had water you couldn't do anything here - no farming nothing, it is thanks to the water”
“Nous remercions le PARF pour ces efforts quand bien même insuffisants parce qu’il faut de gros moyens pour que nous puissions avoir l’eau en permanence.”
“la régularisation du système hydraulique du Faguibine reste un défi”
“Désormais, le peu d'eau qui arrive jusqu'à la mare ne sert qu'à cultiver de quoi survivre.”
Where accounts differ
Each party's account, side by side, with its source. The record does not settle these points; it shows them.
Channel deepening "a favorisé. l'alimentation précoce en eau de certains lacs" (Tassakane, Kondi, Marigot de Goundam, Kamaïna); the flood began in March in 2014-2015 against early September in 2011-2012; regularising the whole system remains a challenge.
Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource CentreThe lake, dry three years earlier, "has again become an area of fertile land around a system of lakes".
World Food Programme (via ReliefWeb)"there seems to be no recovery as can be seen in the 2016 image".
UN Environment, Science DivisionNiger inflows remain too weak since the complete drying of 1983; recent levels allowed only occasional flooding of the south-east; a 2019 flood reached land long used for grazing.
Groupe URD for the Agence Française de DéveloppementDescribes a cracked lake bed; a farmer says the little water reaching the pond serves only to grow enough to survive.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC Newsroom)The drying since the mid-1970s was caused by climate change and by human interventions: deforestation, barriers on the feeding channels and fishing dikes inside the channels, locally and in the upper Niger basin.
Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource CentreRejected any role for the Sélingué and Markala dams in the fall in Niger flows.
Groupe URD for the Agence Française de DéveloppementThe Markala and Sélingué dams are often blamed.
Groupe URD for the Agence Française de DéveloppementThe Sélingué dam has already reduced the water flooding the Inner Niger Delta; the Fomi Dam and planned irrigation schemes are expected to reduce it further.
UN Environment, Science DivisionDeclining rainfall since 1968 and, apparently, upstream irrigation; no study has evaluated the real impact of the pumping; sanding of the channels is also attributed to wind erosion and to gardens made at the banks.
Groupe URD for the Agence Française de Développement35 of 42 producers interviewed enlarged their cultivated area by a quarter or half a hectare; the lean season shortened from 5 to 3 months.
Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource CentreSown areas 2009-2010 to 2015-2016: millet 5,524 to 557 ha, sorghum 22,760 to 3,500 ha, maize 15,900 to 185 ha, rice 9,672 to 12,114 ha; the evaluation attributes the falls to insecurity and poor rainfall.
Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource CentreHow it looked
Shown
- The project presented as one whose result would be that "La mise en eau d’une bonne partie du système est assurée" with agriculture, livestock and fishing services restored.PARF logical framework, as set out in the final evaluation · Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- The channel work presented as a success: "In just 3 years the work has made the desert bloom."World Food Programme · World Food Programme (via ReliefWeb)
- The evaluation presented the project's overall balance as satisfactory with an implementation rate of 60%.Final evaluation of the PARF first phase · Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
Recorded
- Budget of 3,911,500,000 FCFA (OMVF fund 2,316,500,000; UNDP-managed fund 1,595,000,000); spending of 2,314,049,317 FCFA and 1,315,518,258 FCFA respectively, with the evaluation citing audits that found no deviation of expenditure.
- 431,360 m3 excavated against 404,000 m3 planned; 120 km of channels in the zone, of which the clearing of the whole remains a challenge according to the evaluation.
- Four machines of the 30 judged necessary (13.33%) were acquired and parked at Sotuba-Bamako because of insecurity.
- Regional agricultural statistics show sown areas falling for millet, sorghum and maize and rising for rice between 2009-2010 and 2015-2016.
- The evaluation does not state the flooded area of the lakes after the works; UNEP's 2017 brief states that there seems to be no recovery in the 2016 image.
In nature's name
Promised
- “La mise en eau d’une bonne partie du système est assurée; beaucoup de services rendus par le système tels que l’agriculture, l’élevage, la pêche sont rétablis” — PARF expected result, as set out in the final evaluation (2011) Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- “Assurer durablement et de façon optimale l’alimentation en eau des lacs en régularisant le système hydraulique du Faguibine” — PARF specific objective, as set out in the final evaluation (2011) Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
Money moved in nature's name
| What | Kind | Amount | Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total budget of the Projet d'Appui à la Restauration du Système Faguibine (PARF), first phase (stated in FCFA (3 911 500 000); shares of Norway and Mali not stated) Government of Mali and Norway (partnership), through the OMVF fund and the UNDP-managed fund Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre | Budget | 3.9bn XOF | 2011–2016 |
| OMVF fund (managed at Goundam), budget (stated in FCFA (2 316 500 000)) OMVF fund set up by the Norwegian foreign ministry Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre | Budget | 2.3bn XOF | 2011–2016 |
| UNDP-managed fund (Bamako), budget (stated in FCFA (1 595 000 000)) UNDP as fund manager on behalf of the Norwegian embassy Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre | Budget | 1.6bn XOF | 2011–2016 |
| Component A (infrastructure and channel deepening and clearing), total budget (stated in FCFA (1 345 000 000); OMVF fund 1 160 000 000 and UNDP fund 185 000 000) OMVF and UNDP funds Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre | Budget | 1.3bn XOF | 2011–2016 |
| OMVF fund, spending reported by the final evaluation (stated in FCFA (2 314 049 317); 99% of the OMVF fund budget) OMVF Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre | Spent | 2.3bn XOF | 2011–2016 |
| UNDP-managed fund, spending reported by the final evaluation (stated in FCFA (1 315 518 258); 82% of the UNDP fund budget; no spending in 2011 and 2012) UNDP on behalf of the Norwegian embassy Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre | Spent | 1.3bn XOF | 2013–2016 |
Benefit to nature: what was measured
The final evaluation, prepared for the OMVF that ran the project, reports 431,360 m3 excavated, earlier arrival of the flood in the dredged channels and 279 ha protected; it is the operator's own account and not an independent measurement. UNEP's 2017 brief reports no recovery of the lake in its 2016 image, and Groupe URD (2020) and the ICRC (2021) describe only occasional flooding of the south-east of the lake and a dry lake bed. No source measures the flooded area attributable to the works.
Operation Ended · First phase extended to the end of 2016; no second-phase document and no OMVF report after 2016 were found, so the later activity of the OMVF is not on record. Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
Findings on record
- Official audit Consultants' final evaluation of the PARF first phase, prepared for the OMVF (2016-07) · Rapport final: Evaluation finale de la 1ère phase du PARF: “Le surcreusement ou curage de certains chenaux a favorisé des changements sur le milieu naturel et l’alimentation précoce en eau de certains lacs” original in French Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- Own admission UN Environment, Foresight Brief (2017-08) · Saving Lake Faguibine - Foresight Brief, Figure 1 caption: “After rehabilitation efforts initiated in 2009, there seems to be no recovery as can be seen in the 2016 image.” UN Environment, Science Division
- Peer-reviewed study Hamerlynck et al., African Journal of Aquatic Science (2016-03-24) · Reflooding the Faguibine floodplain system, northern Mali: potential benefits and challenges: “the flooded surface area declined from about 1 000 km2 in the late 19th century to only some 90 km2 in 2010” African Journal of Aquatic Science 41(1): 109-117 (Hamerlynck, Moulaye Zeine, Mutua, Mukhwana, Yéna)
Who gained
Reached nature or the ground
Gained elsewhere
Responses on record
- Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF) (July 2016): The final evaluation prepared for the OMVF rated the project's balance as satisfactory with a 60% implementation rate, found that the channel deepening had produced earlier water arrival in some lakes, and recommended more equipment, an internal monitoring plan and faster administrative and financial procedures. · Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- UNDP (2011–2016): No statement of its own is recorded in the sources reviewed; the final evaluation records that it managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA on behalf of the Norwegian embassy and notes occasional slowness in processing and paying invoices. · Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre
- Government of Norway: No statement of its own is recorded in the sources reviewed; named in the final evaluation as financial partner and as having set up the two funds.
- World Food Programme (14 December 2009): Reported in December 2009 that it supplied food to people clearing the channels and that it continued to supply food for maintenance. · World Food Programme (via ReliefWeb)
In court and with insurers
Lawsuits and rulings
Insurers
What nature saw
Nature's report opens this page. Below: further outcomes measured on the ground.
What we don't know
Nature
Accounts
- Disputed Effect of the project on crop production
Record
- None on record Not stated: the share of the PARF budget contributed by Norway and by the Government of Mali. The final evaluation names both as financial partners and says the Norwegian foreign ministry set up the two funds, without giving each party's amount.
- None on record None on record: a measurement of the flooded area of the lakes after the PARF works. The final evaluation reports when the flood began in the dredged channels, not how far it spread.
- Insufficient Insufficient: the evaluation's own measure of results. It gives an implementation rate of 60% in its summary and 55.83% of indicators in its efficiency section, and says its weak monitoring system does not allow a real estimate of indicator achievement.
- Disputed Disputed: whether the works re-watered the lakes. The final evaluation and WFP (2009) report water reaching lakes earlier and fertile land returning; UNEP (2017), Groupe URD (2020) and the ICRC (2021) describe no recovery, occasional flooding of the south-east only, or a dry lake bed.
- Disputed Disputed: the effect on crops. Beneficiaries interviewed reported larger cultivated areas, while regional agricultural statistics show falls for millet, sorghum and maize.
- Insufficient Insufficient: the cause of the drying. No study has evaluated the impact of upstream pumping on Niger flows (Groupe URD); the national hydraulics directorate rejected a role for the Sélingué and Markala dams in studies of 1987 and 1995, while UNEP's 2017 brief states the Sélingué dam has reduced flooding of the Inner Niger Delta.
- None on record None on record: a budget or tonnage for the WFP food-for-work programme; WFP's report gives none.
Did the harm stop?
The sources reviewed do not report that the drying has stopped: UNEP's 2017 brief reports no recovery of the lake in its 2016 image, Groupe URD (2020) reports only occasional flooding of the south-east, and the ICRC (2021) reports buried houses and a closed school.
Who paid?
The final evaluation names Norway as financial partner and thanks the Malian state for financial support; the budget of 3,911,500,000 FCFA was split between a fund managed by the OMVF at Goundam (2,316,500,000 FCFA) and a fund managed by UNDP (1,595,000,000 FCFA). Each party's share is not stated.
Sources
Government and regulators
- Rapport final: Evaluation finale de la 1ère phase du Projet d'Appui à la Restauration du Système Faguibine (PARF) (archived copy of 16 April 2021)Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF), Ministère de l'Agriculture, Mali; hosted by the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre · 2016-07
- Loi n°06-011 du 27 janvier 2006 portant création de l'Office pour la mise en valeur du Système Faguibine (FAOLEX abstract)Republic of Mali, via UNEP Law and Environment Assistance Platform · 2006-01-27
Communities and civil society
- Lac Faguibine: un territoire au coeur de dynamiques complexes (rapport d'étude, version finale; study period November 2019 to February 2020, publication date not stated)Groupe URD for the Agence Française de Développement · 2020
- Changement climatique au Mali: le désert engloutit le lac Faguibine, la population poussée à l'exodeInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC Newsroom) · 2021-09-28
Researchers
- Reflooding the Faguibine floodplain system, northern Mali: potential benefits and challenges (abstract page)African Journal of Aquatic Science 41(1): 109-117 (Hamerlynck, Moulaye Zeine, Mutua, Mukhwana, Yéna) · 2016-03-24
International bodies
- Mali: Restoring lake in desert, farmers keep hunger awayWorld Food Programme (via ReliefWeb) · 2009-12-14
- Saving Lake Faguibine - Foresight BriefUN Environment, Science Division · 2017-08
- Benefits galore if Mali's Lake Faguibine system were revivedUNEP - UN Environment Programme · 2016-06-28
Connected cases
- Lake Faguibine ecosystem rehabilitation project (UNEP, Norway, UEMOA), Mali Mali · 1974–2017 Related matter
- Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine (OMVF) (Public authority) — here: Created by law in 2006; executing body of the PARF and manager of the OMVF fund; there: Malian office created in 2006 to maintain the Faguibine channels; national partner listed in UNEP's fact sheet
- Government of Mali (Government) — here: Partner in the PARF through the Ministry of Agriculture, owner of the project; credited with financial support; there: Requested the UN system's support in June 2008; partner in the project through the Office pour la Mise en Valeur du Système Faguibine
- Government of Norway (Government) — here: Financial partner of the PARF; its foreign ministry set up the two funds; there: Named donor in UNEP's project fact sheet (budget USD 1 million)
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Listed as an external partner in UNEP's fact sheet
- World Food Programme (WFP) (International organisation) — here: Supplied food for work to people clearing the channels; there: Supplied food for work to local people clearing the channels; listed as a partner in UNEP's fact sheet
- Costa Rica payments for ecosystem services and forest recovery Costa Rica · 1997
- Government of Norway (Government) — here: Financial partner of the PARF; its foreign ministry set up the two funds; there: Paid USD 2 million for the only carbon sale recorded
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Nominated the programme for the Earthshot Prize
- Great Green Wall: USD 19bn tracked, USD 2.5bn disbursed by March 2023, and a restored area reported at between 1.66 and almost 18 million hectares Sahel (11 countries) · 2007–2026
- World Food Programme (WFP) (International organisation) — here: Supplied food for work to people clearing the channels; there: Pledged close to USD 300 million; reports 325,350+ ha rehabilitated 2021-2025
- French Development Agency (Public authority) — here: Commissioned a 2019-2020 study before considering support to the Faguibine system in 2020; there: Donor; EUR 704 million GGW-eligible 2020-2025
- Afforestation of the dried Aral Sea bed in Uzbekistan Uzbekistan · 2018–2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Publisher of the trust fund's financial report (UNDP MPTF Office)
- Amazon Fund (Fundo Amazônia), managed by BNDES: donations, projects, the 2019–2022 freeze and the restart Brazil · 2008–2026
- Government of Norway (Government) — here: Financial partner of the PARF; its foreign ministry set up the two funds; there: Largest donor; halted payments in 2019 and announced the fund's revival in 2023
- Artisanal gold in Mali: mercury use and its money (Minamata National Action Plan) Mali · 2018–2020
- Government of Mali (Government) — here: Partner in the PARF through the Ministry of Agriculture, owner of the project; credited with financial support; there: Ministry of Environment, Sanitation and Sustainable Development published the plan
- Asiatic cheetah conservation project in Iran: 25 years of funding and a count of 26 animals Iran · 2000–2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: GEF agency for Phase I; led Phase II; support ended December 2017
- Banc d'Arguin National Park, the BACoMaB trust fund and fishing pressure Mauritania · 2002–2025
- French Development Agency (Public authority) — here: Commissioned a 2019-2020 study before considering support to the Faguibine system in 2020; there: Funder (EUR 18 million committed since 2013); commissioned the 2021 evaluation
- EU taxonomy hydropower exemption and California large hydro exclusion European Union / United States · 2002–2021
- Government of Norway (Government) — here: Financial partner of the PARF; its foreign ministry set up the two funds; there: Government that supported the exemption
- Fosen wind farm and Sámi reindeer herders Norway · 2016–2024
- Government of Norway (Government) — here: Financial partner of the PARF; its foreign ministry set up the two funds; there: Government
- GEF/UNDP project for the Titicaca-Desaguadero-Poopó-Salar de Coipasa system: USD 7.1 million grant, concept approved December 2025 Bolivia · 2025
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: GEF agency implementing the project
- Global Environment Facility Trust Fund: replenishments and independent evaluation Global · 1991–2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Agency with the largest share of cumulative approvals (36 percent in the Trustee's chart)
- Global Fund for Coral Reefs (GFCR) Global · 2020–2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Named in the Fund's reporting
- Hamoun wetlands, Helmand water and the EU/UNDP restoration project Iran · 1973–2025
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Implementer of the EU-funded project
- Ili River and Lake Balkhash: inflow from China, Kapshagay releases and a French-funded master plan Kazakhstan · 2024–2026
- French Development Agency (Public authority) — here: Commissioned a 2019-2020 study before considering support to the Faguibine system in 2020; there: Funds the Balkhash master plan with a EUR 1.35 mln grant
- Kazakhstan's funding for Caspian level research and the Japan-funded UNDP monitoring initiative (2025–2026) Kazakhstan · 2025–2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Implements the UNDP-Japan initiative
- Kunming Biodiversity Fund (China and UNEP) China · 2021–2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Named partner and recipient of project funds
- Lake Urmia decline and the Urmia Lake Restoration Program Iran · 1995–2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Implemented the Japanese-funded phases
- Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex: Barrick–Mali dispute, provisional administration and settlement Mali · 2023–2026
- Government of Mali (Government) — here: Partner in the PARF through the Ministry of Agriculture, owner of the project; credited with financial support; there: 20% owner; claimant in tax and mining-code dispute; party to the settlement
- Mali gold mine closures handed to the state: Yatela, Morila and Sadiola closure money Mali · 2019–2025
- Government of Mali (Government) — here: Partner in the PARF through the Ministry of Agriculture, owner of the project; credited with financial support; there: Buyer of Yatela; created the closure fund; took over Yatela and Morila
- Malibya concession in the Office du Niger and the Inner Niger Delta water balance Mali · 2008–2019
- Government of Mali (Government) — here: Partner in the PARF through the Ministry of Agriculture, owner of the project; credited with financial support; there: Party to the 2008 convention; granted the land and water rights
- Messok Dja ecoguard abuses (Republic of Congo) Republic of Congo · 2008–2020
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Implementing agency of GEF project 9159; investigator (SECU0009)
- Mongolia's dzud winters and degraded pasture: emergency funding for herders Mongolia · 2010–2024
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Carcass removal and income generation, 2010
- Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol Global · 1991–2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Implementing agency named in the 2004 evaluation
- Namibia landed thousands of tonnes of pilchard as bycatch under moratorium Namibia · 1994–2024
- Government of Norway (Government) — here: Financial partner of the PARF; its foreign ministry set up the two funds; there: Ran a 2024 independent biomass study
- Nornickel Sulphur Programme: SO2 targets, spending and measured emissions at Norilsk and Kola Russia · 2015–2026
- Government of Norway (Government) — here: Financial partner of the PARF; its foreign ministry set up the two funds; there: Reported to have granted NOK 300 million in the early 1990s to reduce Nikel emissions
- Norway postpones deep-sea mining licensing to 2029 in budget deal Norway · 2025–2029
- Government of Norway (Government) — here: Financial partner of the PARF; its foreign ministry set up the two funds; there: Government that postponed the licensing
- Norway–Indonesia REDD+ partnership: the 2010 Letter of Intent, payments made and Indonesia's 2021 termination Indonesia · 2010–2022
- Government of Norway (Government) — here: Financial partner of the PARF; its foreign ministry set up the two funds; there: Donor under the 2010 Letter of Intent; agreed the NOK 530 million payment
- Olkaria geothermal projects (Kenya) Kenya · 2013–2017
- French Development Agency (Public authority) — here: Commissioned a 2019-2020 study before considering support to the Faguibine system in 2020; there: Financier
- Pillay panel finds no proof WWF directed ranger abuses it supported Democratic Republic of the Congo · 2006–2020
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: UN agency; draft investigation of Messok Dja
- Socio Bosque programme, Ecuador: payments for forest conservation since 2008 Ecuador · 2008–2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Prepared the 2018 Environmental and Social Assessment for the Green Climate Fund proposal
- Sudan gum arabic belt: wartime production losses and EU and GCF funding Sudan · 2013–2028
- French Development Agency (Public authority) — here: Commissioned a 2019-2020 study before considering support to the Faguibine system in 2020; there: Implementing partner of the EU grant
- Tropical Forest Forever Facility Brazil · 2025
- Government of Norway (Government) — here: Financial partner of the PARF; its foreign ministry set up the two funds; there: Pledged about 3 billion dollars (part conditional)
- Venezuela 2026 twin earthquakes insurance gap Venezuela · 2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Source of the $6.7 billion damage estimate
- Venezuela tree cover loss, 2001–2024, and international forest finance Venezuela · 2001–2024
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Agency for GEF projects 3609 and 3865 and GCF readiness
- WWF-funded ranger units accused of torture and killings in Asia and Africa Multiple countries · 2006–2023
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Investigation into the Messok Dja park programme (leaked draft)
- Zagros oak forests: the UNDP/GEF Central Zagros project, its evaluation and the fires of 2024–2026 Iran · 2005–2026
- UN Development Programme (International organisation) — here: Managed the fund of 1,595,000,000 FCFA for the Norwegian embassy; there: Implementing agency of the Central Zagros project