Who gains from saving nature
Ledger 1 : 33 — For each dollar financing nature-based solutions in 2023, about $33 financed activities harmful to nature. (UNEP)
Cases / Carbon credits · China · 2025

Verra suspension of Chinese rice project verifiers

Nature's voice · report
No measurement of the harm done to me here is on record.
Did nature suffer? Not measured.
Not on record
  • The record does not name which of my species, waters, soils or forests were harmed.
What the record lacks: 1 none on record · 2 insufficient · 1 not measured · 2 disputed · 2 unclear See the gaps

In March 2025 the carbon standard Verra rejected 37 rice methane projects in China and suspended four verification bodies that had audited them. The case raises the question of who pays and who checks the checkers.

37Rice methane projects rejected by Verra
March 2025; four verification bodies suspended.

Status As of March 2025: Verra rejected 37 Chinese rice projects and suspended four verification bodies; no later outcome found.

What?
Verra rejected 37 rice methane projects in China and suspended four verification bodies that had audited them. Verra
Where?
China. Verra
When?
March 2025. Verra
Who?
Gained
None on record
Lost
None on record
Harmed
None on record
Why?
The announcement's stated reasons are not recorded in the sources reviewed beyond the finding that 25 of the projects had issued excess credits. Verra
How?
The developer chooses and pays the verifier; Verra's income is largely a share per credit; Verra suspended the verifiers after review.
5 of 6 questions answered from the record · open: who

What happened

The record, in order.

In March 2025 Verra, the carbon credit standard-setter and registry, rejected 37 rice cultivation (methane) projects in China and suspended the four verification bodies that had audited them. The register entry names them as CCSC (China Classification Society Certification), CQC (China Quality Certification Center), CTI and TÜV Nord. It says that 25 of the projects had issued excess credits.

Under the system described in the sources reviewed, the project developer chooses the verifier and pays it; the verifier pays a registration fee to Verra; and most of Verra's income comes from a fee per credit. Verra's per-credit share rose on 30 March 2023 from US$0.10 to US$0.20, and has been US$0.23 per tonne since 2025. Verra's 2023 revenue was US$29.8 million.

In October 2024, before the suspension, Verra told the Dutch outlet Follow the Money that verifiers are kept impartial through accreditation, and that the party requesting an audit paying for it is standard practice in every sector. Follow the Money wrote that the fee structure gave Verra a financial interest in not being too strict.

Researchers Coglianese and Giles found that 21 of Verra's 33 approved auditors had signed 305 audits of 95 projects known to have been over-credited. Verra found the research biased. The auditors' association, IAVVB, argued that responsibility lay with the registry.

  1. 202330 March: Verra's per-credit share raised from US$0.10 to US$0.20
  2. 2024October: Verra tells Follow the Money that accreditation keeps verifiers impartial
  3. 2025Fee US$0.23 per tonne in force; March: Verra rejects 37 Chinese rice projects and suspends four verification bodies

What was said

Claims, in the words of those who made them.

Where accounts differ

Each party's account, side by side, with its source. The record does not settle these points; it shows them.

Who is responsible when verified projects are later found over-credited?
Researchers
Coglianese and Giles

21 of Verra's 33 approved auditors signed audits of 95 projects known to be over-credited (305 audits).

Standard-setters and registries
Verra

Found the research biased.

Communities and civil society
IAVVB (auditors' association)

Responsibility lies with the registry.

Does the developer-pays model compromise verification?
Press and investigations
Follow the Money

The structure gives Verra a financial interest in not being too strict.

Standard-setters and registries
Verra

Accreditation keeps verifiers impartial; the requesting party paying is standard practice in every sector.

How it looked

What was shown, beside what was recorded.

Shown

  • Verra said that accreditation keeps its verifiers impartial and that the party requesting an audit paying for it is standard practice in every sector.
    Verra, to Follow the Money

Recorded

  • Verra rejected 37 rice methane projects in China and suspended the four verification bodies that audited them (CCSC, CQC, CTI, TÜV Nord); 25 of the projects had issued excess credits.
    Verra
  • 21 of Verra's 33 approved auditors signed 305 audits of 95 projects later known to be over-credited (Coglianese and Giles).
  • The developer chooses and pays the verifier; Verra's income is largely a share per credit.

Who gained

Money that reached nature, beside money that stayed elsewhere.

Reached nature or the ground

Not published
No figure published.

Gained elsewhere

Not totalled
Currency: USD · Window: 2023. All figures cover the same period. * Estimate built from cited figures.

Responses on record

  • verra (March 2025): Rejected 37 rice cultivation projects in China and suspended the verification bodies involved. · Verra
  • verra (October 2024): Told Follow the Money that accreditation keeps verifiers impartial and that the party requesting an audit paying for it is standard practice in every sector.
  • iavvb: Argued that responsibility lay with the registry.

In court and with insurers

Every proceeding and every insurer decision on record.

Lawsuits and rulings

No court case on record. No court has ruled on this case.

Insurers

No insurer decision on record.

What nature saw

Outcomes measured on the ground, and nature's note.

Nature's report opens this page. Below: further outcomes measured on the ground.

Projects rejected
37
Rice methane projects in China, March 2025
Projects that had issued excess credits
25
Of the 37, per the register entry citing Verra
Independent ecological evaluation
None found
No source reviewed reports methane measurements at the rice fields.

What we don't know

Undisclosed, unproven, untried: recorded as data.
Under standard-setter review

Nature

  • Not measured Harm to nature: The record holds no measurement of harm to nature.

Figures

  • Insufficient Credits affected annual: Reported, not independently verified.

Accounts

  • Disputed Who is responsible when verified projects are later found over-credited?
  • Disputed Does the developer-pays model compromise verification?

Record

  • Insufficient How many credits were affected: one register entry gives about 21 million credits of annual supply, but the figure is not tied to a primary document in the sources reviewed (reported, not independently verified).
  • Unclear Whether the suspended verifiers' names appear in other sources: an earlier check found them only in the register entry citing Verra's announcement.
  • Unclear Whether the suspensions remain in force: not stated in the sources reviewed.
  • None on record The responses of the four suspended verification bodies: none found in the sources reviewed.

Did the harm stop?

Not stated in the sources reviewed.

Who paid?

Not stated in the sources reviewed.

Sources

Voices on record: — Company or project— Government and regulators— Courts— Press and investigations— Communities and civil society— Researchers✓ Standard-setters and registries

Standard-setters and registries

Connected cases

Related matters, and cases linked to this one through the same organisations, with the role each played in both.
Terms used on this page

Carbon and conservation finance

Buffer pool
A reserve of credits held back from sale by a carbon programme to cover future losses, such as forest burned or logged after credits were issued. It works as the programme's own insurance.
Carbon credit
A certificate representing one tonne of carbon dioxide (or equivalent) that a project says it reduced, avoided or removed. Buyers use credits to balance their own emissions in climate claims.
Excess credits
Credits issued beyond the amount that a later review found to be justified.
REDD+
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation. A UN framework under which forest projects earn carbon credits for deforestation they say they prevented, measured against a projected baseline.
Standard-setter and registry
An organisation that writes the rules for carbon credits, approves projects, and records when credits are issued and retired. Such bodies typically charge fees per credit.