Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant under Russian control, 2022–2026
- My plant lost off-site power completely 24 times by 7 August 2026, according to BASE's chronology of IAEA statements. BASE (Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management, Germany)
- No abnormal radiation was recorded in BASE's 2025–2026 entries. BASE (Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management, Germany)
Russian forces have held the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, Europe's largest, since March 2022. The IAEA's reports, relayed by BASE, record repeated losses of off-site power and a falling cooling-pond level after the Kakhovka dam was destroyed; Energoatom reported losses of UAH 598.9 billion in lost revenue and delivered a USD 3 billion treaty dispute notice to Russia.
Count in BASE's chronology of IAEA statements; a Ukrainian official called the outage reported on 29 August 2026 “the 27th blackout”. Counts differ.
Status As of October 2026: the plant was under Russian control with six reactors in cold shutdown; Ferosplavna-1 was reconnected on 7 September 2026 after almost three weeks without off-site power; Rostekhnadzor had licensed Units 1 and 2; no settlement or arbitration case is on record.
- Russia / Rosatom — Control of the plant under the decree of 5 October 2022 and Rostekhnadzor licences for Units 1 and 2; restart plans stated by Rosatom World Nuclear News
- Energoatom — Lost revenue of UAH 598.9 billion to 27 February 2026 (company calculation); supplies 40–50 MW to the plant's own needs at its own cost Interfax-Ukraine
- Cooling pond and Dnipro basin water supply to the plant — Level down just over 3.2 m from June 2023 to September 2025; reliance on groundwater wells Interfax-Ukraine
- Plant safety systems — Repeated complete losses of off-site power; diesel reserves depleted in August 2026 BASE (Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management, Germany)
What happened
On 4 March 2022 a projectile hit a training centre at the Zaporizhzhia plant overnight and started a fire; Russia took military control of the site while Ukrainian staff kept operating it. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said that the projectile “is coming from the Russian forces” and that the integrity of the reactors was not compromised; Russia's Defence Ministry blamed Ukrainian “saboteurs”, and Reuters could not independently verify either account. Energoatom and Rosatom confirmed on 13 March 2022 that Rosatom staff had arrived at the site. IAEA personnel have been present at the plant since 1 September 2022; the plant stopped generating electricity on 11 September 2022 and all six reactors were later in cold shutdown. On 5 October 2022 President Putin signed a decree creating the Operating Organisation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP and taking the nuclear facilities into Russian federal ownership; Ukraine's Energoatom called the arrangement “worthless, absurd and inadequate”.
The destruction of the Kakhovka dam on 6 June 2023 lowered the reservoir that supplied cooling water. According to World Nuclear News, the reservoir stood at about 16.4 m that morning and water could no longer be pumped below 12.7 m; Grossi said the cooling pond would be sufficient for some months. By 30 September 2023, 11 new groundwater wells supplied about 250 m³/hour, estimated enough for all 12 sprinkler ponds (BASE). The IAEA said on 4 September 2025, as reported by Interfax-Ukraine, that the cooling-pond level had fallen by just over 3.2 m since June 2023, nearly 60 cm in the previous three months; an isolation dam had been built in the cooling-pond channel and all twelve sprinkler ponds were full. In February 2026 Rosatom's director general Alexei Likhachev said construction had started on a floating modular pumping station of up to 80,000 m³/hour.
Off-site power was repeatedly lost. The IAEA reported, according to BASE, a ninth complete outage on 4 July 2025 and 24 complete outages by 7 August 2026, 12 of them in four months. A 750 kV line was cut on 24 March 2026, leaving the plant on a single 330 kV line. The last line was cut again on 20 August 2026 at 00:44, cause undetermined, and the plant ran on seven diesel generators until the Ferosplavna-1 line was reconnected on the evening of 7 September 2026 after repairs under a local ceasefire brokered by Grossi, the seventh such ceasefire. The IAEA urged replenishment of depleted diesel reserves; Al Jazeera, citing AP, reported about 10 days of diesel on site on 29 August 2026. In August 2026 work began to raise water levels in the spent-fuel pools of all six units. A drone hit a turbine building on 30 May 2026; the IAEA reported damage to a wall and a hatch and drone debris, without attributing it. BASE's entries for 2025–2026 record no abnormal radiation.
Russia's regulator Rostekhnadzor issued a 10-year operating licence for Unit 1 on 23 December 2025 and for Unit 2 on 19 February 2026; licences for Units 3–5 were planned by the end of 2026 and an application for Unit 6 was pending. Rosatom said the licence confirmed that equipment, safety systems and personnel qualifications fully complied, and that restarts were conditional on there being no military threat. Likhachev said in May 2025 that a plan existed to bring the plant to full capacity, with four tasks: water supply, replacing power grids, rebuilding railway infrastructure and “American fuel”. Grossi said in June 2025 that there was a common view that a restart in the current military situation would be inadvisable. Zelensky's 20-point plan of 30 December 2025 gave Ukraine 50% of the plant's output (NucNet).
Energoatom reported losses by its own calculations: more than UAH 210 billion by 18 June 2024 (acting head Petro Kotin), and lost production of 155.02 million MWh and lost revenue of UAH 598.9 billion as of 27 February 2026. Its chairman, Pavlo Kovtoniuk, said Ukraine supplied 40–50 MW to the plant's own needs, a financial loss Energoatom bore. In March 2023 Energoatom delivered a notice of dispute to Russia under Article 9(1) of the 1998 Ukraine–Russia investment agreement over its investments in Zaporizhzhia region, including the plant, with Shearman & Sterling LLP; Global Arbitration Review reported the amount as USD 3 billion. The company said that, failing an amicable resolution, it intended to refer the dispute to international arbitration. Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office opened proceedings on 4 March 2022 citing Article 441 (ecocide) and Article 258(2) (terrorist act) of the Criminal Code over the attack on the plant.
- 2022Projectile hits training centre, Russia takes control (4 Mar); Prosecutor General opens proceedings (4 Mar); Rosatom staff arrive (13 Mar); IAEA personnel at the plant (1 Sep); generation stops (11 Sep); Putin decree on the operating organisation (5 Oct)
- 2023Energoatom delivers treaty dispute notice to Russia (Mar); Kakhovka dam destroyed (6 Jun); 11 new wells supply about 250 m³/hour (by 30 Sep)
- 2024Energoatom reports losses of more than UAH 210bn (18 Jun)
- 2025Ninth complete outage (4 Jul); cooling-pond level down just over 3.2 m since June 2023 (4 Sep); Rostekhnadzor licence for Unit 1 (23 Dec)
- 2026Licence for Unit 2 (19 Feb); Energoatom lost revenue UAH 598.9bn (27 Feb); 750 kV line cut (24 Mar); drone hits turbine building (30 May); complete loss of off-site power 20 Aug–7 Sep; Ferosplavna-1 reconnected (7 Sep)
What was said
“this projectile is a projectile that is coming from the Russian forces”
“the integrity of the reactors in themselves was not compromised”
“designed to ensure the safe operation of the NPP and the professional activities of the existing plant personnel”
“worthless, absurd and inadequate”
“will be sufficient to provide water for cooling for some months”
“reliable access to cooling water is essential for nuclear safety and security”
“The availability of diesel fuel is of paramount importance whenever a nuclear power plant loses off-site power”
“the 27th blackout”
“We have developed a plan for bringing Zaporizhia NPP to full capacity”
“Our goal remains unchanged - to prepare all units for future generation”
“confirms that the power unit's equipment, safety systems, and personnel qualifications fully comply”
“This is exclusively a Ukrainian plant.”
“Failing an amicable resolution of the dispute, the Company intends to refer this dispute to international arbitration.”
“It is difficult to give an exact timeframe for the restoration process.”
Where accounts differ
Each party's account, side by side, with its source. The record does not settle these points; it shows them.
“This is exclusively a Ukrainian plant.” Russian licences do not meet international standards and are political (Interfax-Ukraine paraphrase, 4 March 2026).
Interfax-UkraineThe nuclear facilities were taken into Russian federal ownership; Rostekhnadzor issued 10-year licences for Unit 1 (23 December 2025) and Unit 2 (19 February 2026).
World Nuclear NewsThe licence “confirms that the power unit's equipment, safety systems, and personnel qualifications fully comply”.
World Nuclear News“this projectile is a projectile that is coming from the Russian forces”; reactor integrity was not compromised.
Reuters (via The Jakarta Post)Blamed Ukrainian “saboteurs”.
Reuters (via The Jakarta Post)Russian shelling caused the damage (World Nuclear News summary).
World Nuclear News24 complete losses by 7 August 2026 and a 25th on 8 August 2026.
BASE (Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management, Germany)Called the outage reported on 29 August 2026 “the 27th blackout”.
Al Jazeera (AP)Numbered the event of 20 June 2026 as the 20th.
Nuclear Engineering InternationalHow it looked
Shown
- A claim that the projectile of 4 March 2022 came from Ukrainian saboteursRussia's Ministry of Defence · Reuters (via The Jakarta Post)
- A claim that the Kakhovka dam damage was caused by Russian shellingUkraine, as summarised by World Nuclear News · World Nuclear News
- A claim that Ukraine was responsible for the Kakhovka dam damageRussia, as summarised by World Nuclear News · World Nuclear News
- A licence that, in Rosatom's account, confirms the safety of the unit's equipment, systems and personnelRosatom · World Nuclear News
- A statement that full nuclear and radiation safety is possible only after de-occupationEnergoatom (paraphrase, September 2026) · Euromaidan Press
Recorded
- BASE's chronology of IAEA statements records no abnormal radiation in any 2025–2026 entry.
- Six reactors in cold shutdown; seven diesel generators running at all times during the outage of 20 August–7 September 2026 (BASE).
- Cooling pond down just over 3.2 m from June 2023 to September 2025; groundwater wells and sprinkler ponds supplying cooling water (IAEA via Interfax-Ukraine; BASE).
- After reconnection the plant's own needs drew 11 MW (Energoatom, via Euromaidan Press).
- IAEA personnel have been present at the plant since 1 September 2022; as of 5 September 2026 the IAEA said both sides were cooperating with it (Bernama/Anadolu).
- Energoatom reported losses of more than UAH 210 billion (USD 5.2 billion as stated by the Kyiv Independent), including UAH 35 billion in the first week and about UAH 6 billion per month, to 18 June 2024 (acting head Petro Kotin).
Who gained
Reached nature or the ground
Gained elsewhere
Responses on record
- russia-ministry-defence (4 March 2022): Blamed Ukrainian “saboteurs” for the projectile of 4 March 2022. · Reuters (via The Jakarta Post)
- rosatom (February 2026): The licence “confirms that the power unit's equipment, safety systems, and personnel qualifications fully comply”; restarts are conditional on no military threat. · World Nuclear News
- energoatom (4 March 2026): The plant is “exclusively a Ukrainian plant”; Russian licences do not meet international standards (Interfax-Ukraine paraphrase). · Interfax-Ukraine
- iaea (June 2025 and September 2026): A restart in the current military situation would be inadvisable (Grossi, June 2025); both sides are cooperating with the IAEA (September 2026). · World Nuclear News
In court and with insurers
Lawsuits and rulings
- 2022–No defendant leftUkraine Prosecutor General's proceedings over the attack on the Zaporizhzhia plantProsecutor General's Office of Ukraine (pre-trial investigation) · Criminal · Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine → No defendant named
On 4 March 2022 the Prosecutor General's Office said it had opened proceedings citing Part 2 of Article 28, Article 441 (ecocide) and Part 2 of Article 258 (terrorist act) of the Criminal Code over the attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant, in connection with the seizure of the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia plants. The status is investigation. Interfax-Ukraine
- 2023–Ongoing$3bn amount reported by Global Arbitration ReviewEnergoatom notice of dispute against Russia under the 1998 investment agreementInternational arbitration (notice stage) · Arbitration · Energoatom (with Shearman & Sterling LLP) → Russia
In March 2023 Energoatom delivered a notice of dispute to Russia under Article 9(1) of the 1998 Ukraine–Russia investment agreement over its investments in Zaporizhzhia region, including the plant. Energoatom said that, failing an amicable resolution, it intended to refer the dispute to international arbitration. No tribunal or award is on record. Transnational Dispute Management
- 2025–2026Outcome not on recordRostekhnadzor operating licences for Zaporizhzhia Units 1 and 2Rostekhnadzor (Russia) · Regulatory · Operating Organisation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP (Rosatom) → Not applicable
Rostekhnadzor issued a 10-year licence for Unit 1 on 23 December 2025 and for Unit 2 on 19 February 2026; an application for Unit 6 was pending and licences for Units 3–5 were planned by the end of 2026. Ukraine's Energoatom says the licences do not meet international standards. World Nuclear News
Insurers
What nature saw
Nature's report opens this page. Below: further outcomes measured on the ground.
What we don't know
Money
- None on record Compensation paid by a party held responsible — None on record.
Court
- Unclear Rostekhnadzor operating licences for Zaporizhzhia Units 1 and 2: outcome not on record.
Accounts
Record
- Disputed Figures differ: BASE's chronology of IAEA statements counted 24 complete losses of off-site power by 7 August 2026 and a 25th on 8 August; Nuclear Engineering International numbered the event of 20 June 2026 as the 20th; a Ukrainian official called the outage reported on 29 August 2026 “the 27th blackout”.
- Disputed Figures differ: Energoatom gave losses of more than UAH 210 billion (18 June 2024) and lost revenue of UAH 598.9 billion (27 February 2026); both are company calculations.
- Disputed Figures differ: the Kakhovka dam collapse is dated 6 June 2023 by World Nuclear News and 5 or 6 June 2023 by BASE.
- Self-reported only Self-reported only: Energoatom's loss figures are company calculations, and the Kyiv Independent article of 18 June 2024 does not say what they exclude or how they were calculated; Energoatom said the losses would be finally determined after de-occupation.
- None on record None on record: measured ecological data on the effects of the cooling-pond decline, the Kakhovka reservoir loss and groundwater draw-down on aquatic ecosystems in nuclear-specific sources.
- None on record None on record: a restart statement for 2025–2026 in BASE's chronology; Interfax (December 2025) and World Nuclear News (February 2026) gave no cost or investment figures for a restart.
- None on record None on record: a case number, tribunal or award in Energoatom's treaty dispute.
- Unclear None on record: a Rosatom figure for spending on the plant, the new power line or the pumping station.
- None on record None on record: a settlement on the plant's status as of October 2026.
- Disputed Disputed: ownership and legal status. Energoatom says the plant is exclusively Ukrainian and that Russian licences do not meet international standards; Russia treats it as federal property under the decree of 5 October 2022, with Rosatom as operator.
- Disputed Disputed: responsibility for the projectile of 4 March 2022 and for the Kakhovka dam damage; Russia and Ukraine give opposing accounts (see disputes).
Did the harm stop?
Ongoing: the plant remained under Russian control as of the latest BASE entry of 11 September 2026, with six reactors in cold shutdown.
Who paid?
Energoatom reported lost revenue of UAH 598.9 billion to 27 February 2026 and said Ukraine supplied 40–50 MW to the plant's own needs at its own cost (chairman, March 2026). None on record: compensation paid by Russia or Rosatom.
Sources
Company or project
- Energoatom Notifies Dispute Against Russia to Recover Damages – Press StatementTransnational Dispute Management · 2023-04
Government and regulators
- On the current situation in UkraineBASE (Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management, Germany) · 2022–2026 (running chronology, latest 11 September 2026)
Press and investigations
- IAEA-brokered ceasefire takes effect for power line repairs at ZaporizhzhiaBernama (Anadolu) · 2026-09-05
- No damage to reactors at Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant: IAEAReuters (via The Jakarta Post) · 2022-03-04
- Ukraine, Russia and control of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plantWorld Nuclear News · 2022-10-06
- IAEA: 'No immediate risk' to Zaporizhzhia from dam damageWorld Nuclear News · 2023-06-06
- IAEA on ZNPP cooling pond levelInterfax-Ukraine · 2025-09-05
- Russian oversight service licenses Zaporozhye NPP to operate 1st reactor unitInterfax (Russia) · 2025-12-23
- Russian regulator issues operating licence for second Zaporizhzhia unitWorld Nuclear News · 2026-02-19
- Rosatom confirms long-term plans to restart ZaporizhiaNuclear Engineering International · 2025-05-28
- Ceasefire allows ZNPP repairsNuclear Engineering International · 2026-06-22
- Ukrainian nuclear power plant without external power for over a weekAl Jazeera (AP) · 2026-08-29
- Zaporizhzhia losses over $5 billionKyiv Independent · 2024-06-18
- Ukraine reliably powers Zaporizhia nuclear plant throughout Russian occupation – Energoatom chiefInterfax-Ukraine · 2026-03-04
- Russian-occupied nuclear plant ran on diesel for almost three weeks…Euromaidan Press · 2026-09-08
- Ukrainian state nuclear company threatens claim against RussiaGlobal Arbitration Review · 2023-04-17
Connected cases
- Chornobyl Exclusion Zone: Russian occupation of 2022 and fires, 2022–2026 Ukraine · 2022–2026 Related matter
- International Atomic Energy Agency (International organisation) — here: Reported on power losses and cooling water, per BASE; staff at the plant since 1 September 2022; there: Reported on radiation, trenches and fires, per BASE
- Ministry of Defence of Russia (Government) — here: Blamed Ukrainian saboteurs for the projectile of March 2022; there: Reported taking control of the plant area; said radiation was normal
- Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (Public authority) — here: Opened proceedings on 4 March 2022; there: Opened proceedings (2022) and notified a suspicion (2025)
- BASE (Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management, Germany) (Public authority) — here: German regulator whose chronology records IAEA statements; there: German regulator whose chronology records IAEA statements
- Drone strike on the Chornobyl New Safe Confinement, 14 February 2025, and the repair funding Ukraine · 2025–2026 Related matter
- International Atomic Energy Agency (International organisation) — here: Reported on power losses and cooling water, per BASE; staff at the plant since 1 September 2022; there: Reported on damage and radiation, per BASE and NucNet
- Government of Ukraine (Government) — here: Disputes Russian ownership; Prosecutor General opened proceedings; there: Attributes the strike to a Russian drone; Energy Ministry estimate
- Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (Public authority) — here: Opened proceedings on 4 March 2022; there: Criminal case over the strike
- BASE (Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management, Germany) (Public authority) — here: German regulator whose chronology records IAEA statements; there: German regulator whose chronology records IAEA statements
- Destruction of the Kakhovka dam and drainage of the Kakhovka reservoir (June 2023) Ukraine · 2023–2026 Related matter
- Government of Ukraine (Government) — here: Disputes Russian ownership; Prosecutor General opened proceedings; there: Co-author of the PDNA and RDNA reports; prosecuting authorities; claimant of environmental damage
- Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (Public authority) — here: Opened proceedings on 4 March 2022; there: Criminal proceedings; ICC data
- Ammonia release at Sumykhimprom (Sumy) and nitric-acid explosions at Rubizhne, 2022 Ukraine · 2022–2024
- Ministry of Defence of Russia (Government) — here: Blamed Ukrainian saboteurs for the projectile of March 2022; there: Gave an opposing account of the Sumy release
- Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (Public authority) — here: Opened proceedings on 4 March 2022; there: Notified suspicion to five Russian officers; stated the damage and ammonia figures
- Strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, 2025 and 2026: IAEA statements on contamination and the Bushehr reactor Iran · 2025–2026
- Rosatom (Company) — here: Russian operator under the decree of 5 October 2022; there: Operator side at Bushehr; halted construction of new units
- International Atomic Energy Agency (International organisation) — here: Reported on power losses and cooling water, per BASE; staff at the plant since 1 September 2022; there: Source of statements on contamination and risk
- Ukraine’s criminal proceedings over wartime environmental harm Ukraine · 2022–2026
- Government of Ukraine (Government) — here: Disputes Russian ownership; Prosecutor General opened proceedings; there: Prosecuting state
- Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (Public authority) — here: Opened proceedings on 4 March 2022; there: Charged the Neutron Source officers; reported the Askania-Nova conviction
- Ukraine's Joint Implementation credits and Kyoto unit sales to Japan and Spain, 2008–2021 Ukraine · 2008–2021
- Government of Ukraine (Government) — here: Disputes Russian ownership; Prosecutor General opened proceedings; there: Seller of AAUs; host of the JI projects
- Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (Public authority) — here: Opened proceedings on 4 March 2022; there: Charged Yulia Tymoshenko (2010); notified suspicion in the insulation case (2018)
- Askania-Nova Biosphere Reserve under occupation, 2022– Ukraine · 2022–2025
- Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (Public authority) — here: Opened proceedings on 4 March 2022; there: Ukrainian prosecutors who sent the indictment to court
- Baikalsk Pulp and Paper Mill: closure and waste clean-up Russia · 1966–2026
- Rosatom (Company) — here: Russian operator under the decree of 5 October 2022; there: Parent of the clean-up contractor FEO
- Carpathian beech, IKEA's supply chain and FSC certification: Earthsight's 2020 findings and the responses Ukraine · 2018–2025
- Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (Public authority) — here: Opened proceedings on 4 March 2022; there: Notified officials of suspicion in 2025 logging cases
- ESPO oil pipeline rerouted away from the Baikal shore (2006) Russia · 2005–2008
- Rostekhnadzor (Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision) (Public authority) — here: Russian regulator; licences for Units 1 and 2; there: Signed the positive state ecological expertise conclusion on 3 March 2006
- French nuclear tests in the Algerian Sahara: buried waste, maps and compensation Algeria · 1960–2026
- International Atomic Energy Agency (International organisation) — here: Reported on power losses and cooling water, per BASE; staff at the plant since 1 September 2022; there: 1999 fact-finding mission; 2005 report
- Fukushima treated water discharge and Chinese seafood ban Japan · 2023–2025
- International Atomic Energy Agency (International organisation) — here: Reported on power losses and cooling water, per BASE; staff at the plant since 1 September 2022; there: Assessed the discharge plan
- Great Man-Made River Project (Libya) and the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer Libya · 1983–2019
- International Atomic Energy Agency (International organisation) — here: Reported on power losses and cooling water, per BASE; staff at the plant since 1 September 2022; there: Assessment of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System
- Kerch Strait storm, November 2007: Volgoneft 139 fuel-oil spill and sulphur-ship sinkings Russia · 2007–2018
- Government of Ukraine (Government) — here: Disputes Russian ownership; Prosecutor General opened proceedings; there: Affected state; damage estimate over USD 1 billion
- Lukoil-Komi oil spills in the Usinsk area and the Kolva River, 2011–2023, damage claims and payments Russia · 2011–2023
- Rostekhnadzor (Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision) (Public authority) — here: Russian regulator; licences for Units 1 and 2; there: Industrial safety regulator; found the line did not meet requirements
- Mkuju River uranium mine and the Selous boundary change Tanzania · 2009–2025
- Rosatom (Company) — here: Russian operator under the decree of 5 October 2022; there: Russian state nuclear company; parent of ARMZ and Mantra Tanzania
- Register of Damage for Ukraine, the Claims Commission convention and the money meant to pay claims Ukraine · 2024–2026
- Government of Ukraine (Government) — here: Disputes Russian ownership; Prosecutor General opened proceedings; there: Claimant State; B3.1 filer
- Sary-Shagan test range lease to Russia: rent, a 1992–1996 compensation clause and an ecological commission Kazakhstan · 1992–2016
- Ministry of Defence of Russia (Government) — here: Blamed Ukrainian saboteurs for the projectile of March 2022; there: Operator of the range (929th State Flight Test Centre ranges nearby)
- Semipalatinsk test site: measured contamination, land reallocation and the Nuclear Safety Zone Kazakhstan · 1949–2026
- International Atomic Energy Agency (International organisation) — here: Reported on power losses and cooling water, per BASE; staff at the plant since 1 September 2022; there: 1998 assessment of radiological conditions
- Semipalatinsk test site: state compensation to residents under Kazakhstan’s 1992 law Kazakhstan · 1949–2025
- International Atomic Energy Agency (International organisation) — here: Reported on power losses and cooling water, per BASE; staff at the plant since 1 September 2022; there: 1998 assessment of radiological conditions at the site
- Suspicion notices over UAH 49.2 million in farmland demining contracts, Mykolaiv oblast Ukraine · 2024–2026
- Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (Public authority) — here: Opened proceedings on 4 March 2022; there: Notified six people of suspicion
- Ukraine's ban on raw-log exports and the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement arbitration, 2015–2026 Ukraine · 2015–2026
- Government of Ukraine (Government) — here: Disputes Russian ownership; Prosecutor General opened proceedings; there: Imposed the export ban and the zero quotas; respondent
- Ukraine's mine contamination, the farmland demining programme and mine-action money Ukraine · 2022–2026
- Government of Ukraine (Government) — here: Disputes Russian ownership; Prosecutor General opened proceedings; there: Sets contamination figures; runs the demining strategy
- Ukraine’s official count of war damage to the environment Ukraine · 2022–2026
- Government of Ukraine (Government) — here: Disputes Russian ownership; Prosecutor General opened proceedings; there: Publisher of the damage figures
- War-related greenhouse-gas emissions and Ukraine’s planned climate damage claim Ukraine · 2022–2026
- Government of Ukraine (Government) — here: Disputes Russian ownership; Prosecutor General opened proceedings; there: Intended claimant