Who gains from saving nature
Ledger 1 : 33 — For each dollar financing nature-based solutions in 2023, about $33 financed activities harmful to nature. (UNEP)
Cases / Carbon credits · Malaysia · 2008–2020

Malua BioBank: biodiversity conservation certificates for a logged forest reserve in Sabah, Malaysia

Nature's voice · report
Loggers worked my forest from the 1950s to the end of 2007; the first round, 1957 to 1999, took about 2.5 million cubic metres, according to Ancrenaz and colleagues.
Did nature suffer? Yes. Harm is on record. Accounts differ ↓
In my name
  • Buyers described differently by Mother Jones and IIED; the number of certificates sold is not stated 0.21 million US dollars were earned in sales in my name. No one has measured what reached me. Mother Jones
Recorded
  • In 2007 about 43% of the area surveyed from the air was degraded and 57% over-degraded, according to the same study. PLoS ONE
  • A land-use study says the large dipterocarp trees were almost entirely removed by 2007. PubMed Central
  • Researchers cite a reported extirpation of orangutan groups in repeatedly and extensively logged forest in the Malua BioBank. PLoS ONE
What the record lacks: 7 none on record · 2 insufficient · 7 disputed See the gaps
Accounts of the harm differ
Projected revenue and the start of the second logging round
  • Press and investigations Mother Jones and Ecosystem Marketplace: Projected gross revenue of US$34 million (Mother Jones) or a projected return of US$36 million (Ecosystem Marketplace). Mother Jones
  • Researchers Ancrenaz et al. (2010): The second logging round ran from 1999 to 2007 over about 20,000 ha. PLoS ONE
  • Researchers Danum Valley land-use paper: Re-logging began in 2003, all workable areas were logged within four years and harvesting ceased in 2007. PubMed Central

In 2008 a private equity fund and the Sabah government issued 3.4 million Biodiversity Conservation Certificates at US$10 each for the 34,000 ha Malua Forest Reserve, with projected revenue of US$34 million. The only sales total in the sources is US$215,000; the fund exited in 2020 and the BioBank's later status is not on record.

US$215,000Biodiversity Conservation Certificates sold, as reported
Total reported by Mother Jones (late 2009) and IIED (2020). Against a projected US$34 million if all 3.4 million certificates sold at US$10; the sources reviewed give no later sales total.

Status As of October 2026: the Eco Products Fund exited in 2020 according to New Forests' 2022 report; the handover, the BioBank's current status and the sales total beyond US$215,000 are not on record.

What?
A private equity fund and the Sabah government issued 3.4 million Biodiversity Conservation Certificates at US$10 each for the Malua Forest Reserve, to fund its rehabilitation and conservation; projected revenue was US$34 million and known sales US$215,000. Mother Jones
Where?
Malua Forest Reserve, about 34,000 ha, near the Danum Valley in Sabah, Malaysian Borneo; launched in Kota Kinabalu. New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund
When?
Launched 14 August 2008; fund term ended June 2017; fund exited 2020; logging of the reserve ended at the end of 2007. New Forests
Who?
Gained
  • Eco Products Fund investors — Were to recover their US$10 million and half of net profits from certificate revenue; investor returns are not on record Mother Jones
  • Sabah government and Yayasan Sabah — Were to share profit with the investor; received the conservation commitment and, according to Mother Jones, the US$10 million Mother Jones
Lost
  • Eco Products Fund investors — IIED judged the project failed to obtain enough predictable demand to be financially viable; the fund exited in 2020 and returns are not on record IIED
Harmed
  • Malua forest and its orangutans — Repeatedly logged before 2008; 43% degraded and 57% over-degraded in 2007; orangutan groups reportedly extirpated in re-logged forest PLoS ONE
Why?
The operators designed the product so conservation could compete with other land uses commercially; target buyers were palm oil, food, energy and cosmetics companies. New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund
How?
The state assigned 50-year conservation rights over a forest reserve to the BioBank; a registry issued one certificate per 100 square metres for sale at US$10; revenue was to repay the fund and endow a trust. New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund
6 of 6 questions answered from the record

What happened

The record, in order.

The Malua BioBank was launched on 14 August 2008 in Kota Kinabalu by the Eco Products Fund, LP, a private equity fund jointly managed by New Forests Inc. and Equator Environmental, LLC, and the Government of Sabah. The press release called it "a first-of-its-kind business model for rainforest conservation". New Forests Asia was to manage conservation activities with the Sabah Forestry Department, and TZ1 Limited was appointed registry. The Malua Forest Reserve, about 34,000 ha, stayed a state forest reserve under a forest management licence held by Yayasan Sabah, a foundation set up by the Sabah government. The state assigned conservation rights for 50 years to the BioBank, and any profit was to be shared between Yayasan Sabah and the BioBank investor. Ecosystem Marketplace reported that logging and palm oil plantations were banned inside the reserve and that a breach would trigger financial penalties against the government.

One Biodiversity Conservation Certificate was issued for each 100 square metres, 3.4 million in all, at US$10 each. Mother Jones reported that New Forests hoped to sell them all within five years, "generating a projected $34 million"; Ecosystem Marketplace gave the projected return as US$36 million. According to Mother Jones the first 20 percent of revenue would go to a trust fund, and the remaining US$27 million would repay investors' original US$10 million plus half of net profits, with the other half going to the Sabah government. The press release said the fund had committed "up to US$10 million" for the rehabilitation of the reserve over six years; Mother Jones wrote that New Forests raised US$10 million from private investors and gave it to the Sabah government to restore Malua and to impose a 50-year moratorium on selling its timber. The sources do not reconcile the two descriptions of where the money went.

The press release named energy, food and cosmetics companies relying on palm oil, and private companies working in or sourcing from Malaysia, as target buyers; it said four Malaysian companies had bought certificates on launch day, without naming them or giving amounts. It stated that buyers "contractually agree that they do not represent an offset against clearing or degradation of other forests". Mother Jones reported that the main prospective buyer was members of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), who would buy an acre of Malua for each acre cleared in exchange for certification, and that the deal stalled when the RSPO doubted the offset value of biobanks that were not located where members had cleared land. By late 2009 New Forests had sold only US$215,000 in certificates, to the operator of an eco-resort in the Danum Valley and a few logging contractors, according to Mother Jones; IIED (2020), citing Brock (2015), attributed US$215,000 of purchases to four palm oil companies that announced their support in 2012. IIED judged that the project struggled with the stigma of for-profit investment, operated in an immature and weakly regulated market and failed to obtain enough predictable demand to be financially viable.

In 2012 the Sabah Forestry and Wildlife departments, four palm oil companies and New Forests signed a voluntary Malua Wildlife Conservation Agreement providing for joint boundary patrols. A Sabah Forestry Department official said in 2013 that the main threat to Malua was its long, porous boundary, and rangers were still finding snare traps, human trails and signs of hunters. New Forests' 2016 sustainability report said it continued to market the certificates and to explore developing the BioBank as a carbon project, that the fund's term would end in June 2017 and that it was preparing to hand management back to the Sabah Foundation and the Sabah Forestry Department. Its 2022 report records that the Eco Products Fund exited in 2020.

Malua was logged before the BioBank. Ancrenaz and colleagues (PLoS ONE, 2010) reported that logging began in the 1950s and continued to the end of 2007: about 2.5 million cubic metres in a first round (1957–1999) and a second round (1999–2007) over about 20,000 ha, leaving about 43% of the surveyed area degraded and 57% over-degraded in 2007, with orangutan densities of about 1.0 to 2.4 per square kilometre. A land-use paper dates the second round to 2003 to 2007 and says the large dipterocarps were almost entirely removed. Gregory and colleagues (2012) cited a reported extirpation of orangutan population groups in repeatedly and extensively logged forest in the Malua BioBank. The sources reviewed contain no orangutan count or forest evaluation from the BioBank period, and no item on the BioBank itself dated 2018 to 2026.

  1. 1957Logging of Malua, begun in the 1950s, enters a first round (1957 to 1999) of about 2.5 million cubic metres
  2. 1999Second logging round begins (Ancrenaz et al.); a land-use paper dates it to 2003
  3. 2007Logging of Malua ends at the end of 2007
  4. 2008BioBank launched in Kota Kinabalu (14 August); four Malaysian companies said to have bought certificates on launch day; TZ1 appointed registry
  5. 2009Mother Jones reports US$215,000 in certificates sold (November/December)
  6. 2012Malua Wildlife Conservation Agreement signed with four palm oil companies; they announce support for the BioBank
  7. 2016New Forests still markets the certificates and explores a carbon project; the fund prepares to hand management back
  8. 2017Eco Products Fund term ends (June)
  9. 2020Eco Products Fund exits (New Forests 2022 report); IIED issue paper (March) judges demand insufficient

What was said

Claims, in the words of those who made them.

“a first-of-its-kind business model for rainforest conservation”

“The purchase of Biodiversity Conservation Certificates represents a contribution to rainforest conservation in Malua, rather than an offset for rainforest impacts that a company may have elsewhere.”

“designed to help economic development and rainforest conservation work for each other”

“Nothing like this has ever been done for the biodiversity in tropical rainforests.”

“It'd be because it's ahead of its time.”

Carroll, Ecosystem Marketplace, on a possible failure of the BioBank · 2009 · Mother Jones

“The voluntary nature of purchases meant it was unable to withstand the shocks to economic markets, failing to obtain enough predictable demand to make the project financially viable.”

IIED issue paper (Porras and Steele) · March 2020 · IIED

“The main threat to Malua is its long and porous boundary which is susceptible to illegal entry and poaching activities.”

Where accounts differ

Each party's account, side by side, with its source. The record does not settle these points; it shows them.

Where the US$10 million investment went
Company or project
New Forests (press release)

The Eco Products Fund "has committed up to US$10 million for the rehabilitation of the Malua Forest Reserve over the next 6 years".

New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund
Press and investigations
Mother Jones

New Forests raised US$10 million from private investors and gave it to the Sabah government to restore Malua and impose a 50-year moratorium on selling its timber.

Mother Jones
Whether the certificates functioned as offsets
Company or project
New Forests (press release)

Buyers "contractually agree that they do not represent an offset against clearing or degradation of other forests".

New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund
Press and investigations
Mother Jones

The main prospective buyers were RSPO members, who would buy one acre of Malua for each acre cleared in exchange for certification; the deal stalled because the RSPO doubted the offset value of biobanks that were not in the regions where members had cleared land.

Mother Jones
Who bought the US$215,000 of certificates
Press and investigations
Mother Jones (late 2009)

The buyers were the operator of an eco-resort in the Danum Valley and a few logging contractors.

Mother Jones
Researchers
IIED (2020), citing Brock (2015)

Four Malaysian palm oil companies (IOI Corporation Berhad, TH Group, Kwantas Corporation Berhad and Perbadanan Kemajuan Pertanian Selangor) publicly announced support in 2012 by purchasing certificates for US$215,000.

IIED
Projected revenue and the start of the second logging round
Press and investigations
Mother Jones and Ecosystem Marketplace

Projected gross revenue of US$34 million (Mother Jones) or a projected return of US$36 million (Ecosystem Marketplace).

Mother Jones
Researchers
Ancrenaz et al. (2010)

The second logging round ran from 1999 to 2007 over about 20,000 ha.

PLoS ONE
Researchers
Danum Valley land-use paper

Re-logging began in 2003, all workable areas were logged within four years and harvesting ceased in 2007.

PubMed Central

How it looked

What was shown, beside what was recorded.

Shown

  • The BioBank described as the first formally appointed biodiversity registry and a "first-of-its-kind" model: certificates sold as a contribution to conservation in Malua, with logging and palm oil plantations banned inside the reserve.
    Malua BioBank operators and the Sabah government · New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund
  • The Sabah government reported as committed to halting logging in the reserve for at least 50 years.
    Mongabay, reporting New Forests and Equator Environmental · Mongabay

Recorded

  • Certificates: 3.4 million issued at US$10 each for about 34,000 ha; projected revenue US$34 million (Mother Jones) or US$36 million (Ecosystem Marketplace).
  • Known sales: US$215,000 by late 2009 (Mother Jones), attributed in 2020 to purchases announced by four palm oil companies in 2012 (IIED). Total certificates sold, revenue, costs, trust fund balance and investor return are not on record.
  • The operator's release states that the certificates are a contribution, not an offset, and that buyers contractually agree they do not offset other forest clearing.
  • Eco Products Fund term ended in June 2017 and the fund exited in 2020; whether management returned to Yayasan Sabah and the Sabah Forestry Department is not on record.
  • The reserve had been logged repeatedly: 43% degraded and 57% over-degraded in 2007 (Ancrenaz et al.); Mother Jones: almost 98 percent of its terrain logged at some point.

In nature's name

What was promised in nature's name, the money that moved, and what was measured.

Promised

  • “a first-of-its-kind business model for rainforest conservation” — Malua BioBank press release (14 August 2008) New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund
  • “Nothing like this has ever been done for the biodiversity in tropical rainforests.” — David Brand, New Forests (2009) Mother Jones

Money moved in nature's name

WhatKindAmountPeriod
Biodiversity Conservation Certificates sold, reported total
Malua BioBank (Eco Products Fund)
Mother Jones
Sales$0.21m2008 to 2012
Projected gross revenue if all 3.4 million certificates sold at US$10
Malua BioBank (Eco Products Fund)
Mother Jones
Sales$34m estimatewithin five years of 2008
Eco Products Fund commitment for rehabilitation of the reserve
Eco Products Fund
New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund
Pledged$10m2008 to 2014

What was measured

Not measured

No independent measurement of forest condition or orangutan numbers during the BioBank period (2008 onward) is on record in the sources reviewed. The operator's figures concern certificates and revenue, not outcomes; the baseline studies describe logging before 2008.

Degraded forest before the BioBank (2007)
43% degraded, 57% over-degraded
Baseline, Ancrenaz et al. PLoS ONE
Orangutan density before the BioBank
about 1.0 to 2.4 per km²
Baseline, Ancrenaz et al. PLoS ONE
Poaching and illegal entry after the BioBank
Snare traps, human trails and hunter signs still found (2013)
Sabah Forestry Department, as reported by The Star The Star via MPOB Palm News

Findings on record

  • Peer-reviewed study Ancrenaz et al., PLoS ONE (2010-07-09) · Orangutan survey in Malua, PLoS ONE 5(7): e11510 PLoS ONE
  • Peer-reviewed study Gregory et al., PLoS ONE (2012-09-07) · Orangutan distribution model: “reported extirpation of population groups in repeatedly and extensively logged forest in Malua BioBank” PLoS ONE

Who gained

Money that reached nature, beside money that stayed elsewhere.

Reached nature or the ground

Not published
No figure published.

Gained elsewhere

Not totalled
Currency: USD · Window: 2008–2012. All figures cover the same period. * Estimate built from cited figures.

Responses on record

  • New Forests and Equator Environmental (Eco Products Fund) (14 August 2008; 2016): The press release stated that the certificates are a contribution to conservation in Malua rather than an offset and that the product was designed so conservation can "compete with other land uses on a commercial basis"; New Forests' 2016 report said the fund would reach the end of its term in June 2017. · New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund
  • Sabah Forestry Department (2008; 2013): Director Sam Mannan said the project was "designed to help economic development and rainforest conservation work for each other"; in 2013 a deputy director named the porous boundary as the main threat. · New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund
  • Government of Sabah (August 2008): Reported as committed to halting logging in the reserve for at least 50 years and to financial penalties for breach. · Ecosystem Marketplace

In court and with insurers

Every proceeding and every insurer decision on record.

Lawsuits and rulings

No court case on record. No court has ruled on this case.

Insurers

No insurer decision on record.

What nature saw

Outcomes measured on the ground, and nature's note.

Nature's report opens this page. Below: further outcomes measured on the ground.

Reserve area covered by certificates
about 34,000 ha
3.4 million certificates, one per 100 square metres (press release)
Degraded forest in 2007, before the BioBank
43% degraded, 57% over-degraded
Ancrenaz et al., surveys 2006–2007 (PLoS ONE, 2010)
Orangutan density before the BioBank
about 1.0 to 2.4 per km²
Ancrenaz et al., depending on forest condition
Orangutan or forest outcome after 2008
Not on record
No count or evaluation from the BioBank period in the sources reviewed

What we don't know

Undisclosed, unproven, untried: recorded as data.

Nature

  • Disputed Projected revenue and the start of the second logging round

Court

Accounts

  • Disputed Where the US$10 million investment went
  • Disputed Whether the certificates functioned as offsets
  • Disputed Who bought the US$215,000 of certificates

Record

  • None on record None on record: the total number of certificates sold, total revenue, costs, the trust fund balance or investor returns; the only sales figure is US$215,000.
  • None on record None on record: whether management was handed to Yayasan Sabah and the Sabah Forestry Department, whether a carbon project was developed, or whether the 50-year conservation-rights arrangement still stands.
  • None on record None on record: any item about the BioBank itself between 2018 and 2026 in the sources reviewed.
  • None on record None on record: an orangutan count or forest evaluation specific to the BioBank period after 2008.
  • None on record None on record: the names of the four Malaysian companies that bought certificates on launch day, or the amounts.
  • None on record None on record: a ranking of Malua by size among mitigation or conservation banks; the operator calls it the first of its kind.
  • Disputed Disputed: who received the US$10 million. The press release says the fund committed it for rehabilitation of the reserve; Mother Jones says it was raised from private investors and given to the Sabah government.
  • Disputed Disputed: the buyers of the US$215,000. Mother Jones names an eco-resort operator and logging contractors; IIED, citing Brock (2015), names four palm oil companies announcing support in 2012.
  • Disputed Disputed: the projected revenue is US$34 million (Mother Jones) or US$36 million (Ecosystem Marketplace), and the start of the second logging round is 1999 (Ancrenaz et al.) or 2003 (a land-use paper).
  • Insufficient Unconfirmed: a summary of a Geoforum paper (Brock, 2015) describes the US$215,000 as paid by four logging companies at launch.
  • Insufficient Unconfirmed: an orangutan atlas listing, seen only in a search summary, gives 2,580 orangutans (confidence interval 1,295 to 5,866) for the Ulu Segama–Malua site with the trend unknown.

Did the harm stop?

The logging recorded in the sources ended at the end of 2007, before the BioBank launched. Rangers were still finding snare traps, human trails and signs of hunters, especially along plantation borders, in 2013.

Who paid?

Certificate buyers paid US$10 per certificate; the known total is US$215,000. The Eco Products Fund committed up to US$10 million over six years; the sources disagree on whether the money went to rehabilitation of the reserve or to the Sabah government.

Sources

Voices on record: ✓ Company or project— Government and regulators— Courts✓ Press and investigations— Communities and civil society✓ Researchers

Company or project

  1. Malua BioBank launch press release
    New Forests Advisory / Eco Products Fund · 2008-08-14

Connected cases

Related matters, and cases linked to this one through the same organisations, with the role each played in both.

Science and environment

Hectare (ha)
A unit of area equal to 10,000 square metres, about 2.5 acres. 100 hectares make one square kilometre.

Carbon and conservation finance

Baseline
The projected scenario of what would have happened without a project, such as an expected rate of deforestation. Credits are issued for the difference between the baseline and what actually happened, so an inflated baseline produces more credits.
Offset
Using carbon credits to balance emissions released elsewhere, so that a buyer can claim lower or zero net emissions.
Standard-setter and registry
An organisation that writes the rules for carbon credits, approves projects, and records when credits are issued and retired. Such bodies typically charge fees per credit.