Caspian Sea level decline: measured fall, modelled scenarios and disputed causes
- In the surveyed north-eastern part of me, water cover fell from 15,194 km2 in 2001 to 8,183 km2 at the end of 2024, and the shore moved back 56.17 km, according to Court et al. University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online
- By 2024 most of Komsomol Bay, where my seals moult, had become desiccated, according to Court et al. University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online
- Models in Court et al. show that a fall of 5 m would turn approximately 77,000 km2 of me into land. University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online
- Government and regulators Ministers and Senior Officials of the five Caspian states (Baku Declaration, 18 November 2024): The decline "is driven by a complex combination of climatic, hydrological, and anthropogenic factors"; the sides aim to set up a working group to identify the causes. Tehran Convention Secretariat
- Researchers Court et al. (Communications Earth & Environment, 2025): The current declining trend is linked to global warming driving reduced precipitation and a sharp increase in sea surface temperature and evaporation; increases in water abstraction may further compound the decline. University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online
- Researchers Prange, Wilke and Wesselingh (2020): The projected decline is mainly caused by global factors and by increased lake evaporation not balanced by river discharge or precipitation; human water withdrawals, damming and diversions often mask climate impacts. University of Bremen (author copy)
- Researchers Duku et al. (Earth's Future, 2026): Total river inflow has declined significantly, mainly through lower Volga discharge; basin precipitation is roughly steady and evaporation shows a modest upward trend; the decline reflects compound anthropogenic and climatic influences. CUNY Academic Works
- Government and regulators Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources (Kazakhstan): Climate change remains the main driver of the long-term decline, together with human activities. The Astana Times
- Government and regulators Azerbaijan and Russia (as characterised by Reuters): Azerbaijan blames Russia's construction of dams on the Volga; Russia mainly blames climate change. Baird Maritime (Reuters)
- Researchers Stanislav Pritchin and Mikhail Bolgov, Russian Academy of Sciences: No new reservoirs are being built or filled and there are no active withdrawal projects; the sea accumulates the inflow–evaporation imbalance over decades and Bolgov sees no direct link between Volga flow changes and the level. Materia Rinnovabile
- Communities and civil society Adylbek Kozybakov (ECOJER) and Rovshan Abbasov (Azerbaijan): Kozybakov: Russia's excessive Volga use disrupted the balance. Abbasov: filling of large Volga reservoirs, Russian demand, climate change, reservoir evaporation and farm expansion; the decline is not solely human-caused and level changes are long-term and cyclical. APA
- Communities and civil society Laura Malikova, Association of Practicing Environmentalists (Kazakhstan): Reservoirs built in Russia such as Iriklinskoye keep a significant share of the water that once flowed to the Caspian, and dredging in the northern Caspian by NCOC and its contractors disrupted feeding grounds and accelerated shallowing. The Astana Times
- Researchers Early models cited by Court et al.: Around 5 m by 2100. University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online
- Researchers Samant and Prange (2023): A best-fit model analysis suggests sea level reductions of about 8 m (inter-model range 2 to 15 m) under SSP245 and about 14 m (range 11 to 21 m) under SSP585 by the end of the century; Court et al. cite 8 m to 14 m under medium to high emission scenarios. Crossref record (Springer Nature)
- Researchers Prange, Wilke and Wesselingh (2020): 9–18 m by the end of the century in medium to high emission scenarios. University of Bremen (author copy)
- Researchers Court et al. (2025) and the University of Leeds news release: Up to 21 m by 2100 under high emissions; the paper gives 5 to 12 m and the news release 5 to 10 m even if warming stays below 2 °C; the paper says observed rates may be on track for the upper range of model predictions. University of Leeds, School of Biological Sciences
The Caspian Sea level fell by 1.4 m in 2006–2021 and by approximately 75 cm in 2022–2024, according to the CASPCOM bulletin cited in a 2025 peer-reviewed paper. Models project 2100 declines of about 8 m to 14 m, 9 m to 18 m or up to 21 m, depending on the study and scenario; the five Caspian states name climatic, hydrological and anthropogenic factors, while Kazakh, Azerbaijani, Russian and research voices differ on the weight of the Volga.
CASPCOM information bulletin No. 27 (15 May 2024), as cited by Court et al. (Communications Earth & Environment, 10 April 2025); the bulletin itself was not available for reading.
Status As of October 2026: the level has continued to fall; the five Caspian states adopted declarations in November 2024 and November 2025 and are preparing an action plan for 2025–2035; causes remain disputed and no agreement on Volga flow was reported as of June 2025.
- Coastal and port users on the Caspian — Court et al. model that settlements, ports and offshore energy installations become stranded tens or hundreds of kilometres from new shorelines; ports have needed dredging (separate record) University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online
- Artisanal and coastal fishing communities in the northern basin — Court et al. wrote that economies could collapse entirely as fishing grounds disappear (modelled) University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online
- Caspian seals — Komsomol Bay moulting site desiccated by 2024; seals moved to emerging islands at lower densities; breeding area modelled to shrink 57% to 81% at 5 m University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online
- Sturgeon — Summer and autumn ranges modelled to shrink 25% at 5 m and about 45% at 10 m University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online
- Protected areas — Marine protected-area coverage modelled to fall from 16.8% to 7% at 5 m and 1% at 10 m University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online
What happened
The Caspian Sea covers around 387,000 km2 and is bordered by Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan; Court et al. (Communications Earth & Environment, 10 April 2025) write that more than 80% of its inflow comes through the Volga and Ural rivers. The paper gives the level as about -25.8 m relative to global mean sea level at the start of the 20th century, a fall of 2 m, a rapid fall between 1970 and 1977 to -29 m, "its lowest level in 100 years", a rise to -26.5 m by 1995 and a further decline of around 2 m since. It cites the CASPCOM level bulletin No. 27 (15 May 2024) for declines "as high as 30 cm per year" since 2020 and states that "water levels fell by 1.4 m in the 16 years 2006 to 2021, and approximately 75 cm 2022 to 2024". Azerbaijan's deputy ecology minister Rauf Hajiyev gave Reuters in August 2025 a fall of 0.93 m in five years, 1.5 m in ten and 2.5 m in thirty, now 20–30 cm a year. Materia Rinnovabile (June 2025) gave the level as -29.21 m (Baltic system) and, citing Kazakhstan's Ministry of Ecology, the surface lost since 2006 at more than 31,000 km2.
Court et al. measured one shallow area of the north-eastern Caspian from NASA Worldview satellite images: within a 21,901 km2 polygon, water covered 15,194 km2 in 2001, 9,197 km2 in October 2022 (a 39% decrease, about 285 km2 per year) and 8,183 km2 at the end of 2024 (a 46% decrease), with the shoreline 56.17 km further back than in 2001. The paper reports that by 2024 most of the Komsomol Bay area, a site recognised under the Convention on Biological Diversity as ecologically or biologically significant and used by Caspian seals for moulting, "had become desiccated" and that seals had moved to newly emerged islands to the north at lower densities. The mean error of its image measurements was 3.6%.
The same paper modelled eight decline scenarios from 2.5 m to 18 m against a -27.5 m datum. A 5 m decline would turn approximately 77,000 km2 of water (around 20%) into land, and an 18 m decline as much as 143,000 km2 (37%). Coverage of marine protected areas would fall from 16.8% of the sea to 7% at 5 m and 1% at 10 m, and the authors give "up to 94%" as the reduction in protected-area coverage. They report that the seal breeding area accessible to seals could shrink by around 57% to 81% at 5 m and sturgeon summer and autumn ranges by 25% at 5 m and about 45% at 10 m; that 8 of 22 industrial facilities studied (ports, refineries and gas plants) would lie more than 5 km further from the shore at 10 m; and that the Kashagan and Filanovsky oil fields "will become landlocked under 5 to 15 m" declines. The authors wrote that the economic cost of disruption "could exceed tens of billions of dollars per year", with no breakdown in the text.
Projections for 2100 are model results and differ by study and emissions scenario. Court et al. cite earlier models at around 5 m, more recent projections of 9 to 21 m under medium to high emissions, "best fit" models of 8 m to 14 m (Samant and Prange, 2023), and up to 21 m under high emissions. Prange, Wilke and Wesselingh (a Comment in the same journal, December 2020) cited a projected fall of 9–18 m in medium to high emission scenarios, which they said was caused by lake evaporation not balanced by river discharge or precipitation, and a surface-area loss of 23% at 9 m and 34% at 18 m. Kazakhstan's Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation gave scenario levels of -31.8 m (moderate) and -33.7 m (severe) by 2050, as reported by the Times of Central Asia in June 2025, and Kapital.kz reported in February 2026 that Deputy Minister Mansur Oshurbayev had said the level could approach minus 33 metres by 2050.
Each party states the cause differently. The ministers of the five Caspian states wrote on 18 November 2024 that the decline "is driven by a complex combination of climatic, hydrological, and anthropogenic factors". Court et al. link the current trend to warming, reduced precipitation and higher evaporation, and add that increases in water abstraction "may further compound" the decline. Kazakhstan's Ministry of Ecology names climate change as the main long-term driver together with human activities. A 2026 paper in Earth's Future (Duku et al.) found total river inflow had fallen significantly, mainly through lower Volga discharge, with basin precipitation roughly steady and evaporation rising modestly. Azerbaijan, per Reuters, blames Russian dam construction on the Volga; Russia, per the same report, mainly blames climate change; Russian experts Stanislav Pritchin and Mikhail Bolgov told Materia Rinnovabile that no new reservoirs or withdrawal projects exist and that the sea accumulates inflow–evaporation imbalances over decades; Kazakh and Azerbaijani commentators cite Russian use and reservoirs. Kazakhstan has asked Russia for a joint working group and guaranteed minimum Volga flows; Moscow, per Caspian Post, treats the Volga as not transboundary. No agreement on Volga flow was reported as of June 2025.
- 1977Level reaches about -29 m, the lowest in 100 years before the present decline (Court et al.); later in the decade it rises to -26.5 m by 1995
- 2001Water cover in the surveyed north-eastern area: 15,194 km2 (NASA Worldview measurement by Court et al.)
- 2006Start of the 16-year period in which the level fell 1.4 m (to 2021), per CASPCOM as cited by Court et al.
- 2020Declines as high as 30 cm per year measured since this year (CASPCOM bulletin No. 27, as cited)
- 2020Prange, Wilke and Wesselingh publish a Comment projecting a 9–18 m fall by 2100 in medium to high emission scenarios (23 December)
- 2024Water cover in the surveyed area down 46% from 2001 (8,183 km2 left); Caspian states adopt a declaration on the level decline in Baku (18 November)
- 2025Court et al. paper published (10 April)
- 2025Kazakhstan seeks a joint working group with Russia on guaranteed minimum Volga flows (reported 23 May–4 June)
- 2025Times of Central Asia reports the Caspian at its lowest recorded level, less than 29 m below sea level (23 July)
- 2026Duku et al. publish an Earth's Future study on human and climatic pressures (5 June)
What was said
“this decline is driven by a complex combination of climatic, hydrological, and anthropogenic factors”
“water levels fell by 1.4 m in the 16 years 2006 to 2021, and approximately 75 cm 2022 to 2024”
“Some Caspian Sea level decline appears unavoidable, even with action to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.”
“no new reservoirs are being built or filled, nor are there any active water withdrawal projects.”
“Because of its immense size, the sea accumulates the imbalance between inflow and evaporation over decades,”
“Russia's excessive use of water from the Volga has seriously disrupted this balance.”
“the volume of water drawn from the Volga has increased.”
“We are well aware that within 75 years we could lose this body of water,”
“The shrinking Caspian Sea might serve as a poster child of the problem that will help to galvanize such actions.”
Where accounts differ
Each party's account, side by side, with its source. The record does not settle these points; it shows them.
The decline "is driven by a complex combination of climatic, hydrological, and anthropogenic factors"; the sides aim to set up a working group to identify the causes.
Tehran Convention SecretariatThe current declining trend is linked to global warming driving reduced precipitation and a sharp increase in sea surface temperature and evaporation; increases in water abstraction may further compound the decline.
University of Leeds / White Rose Research OnlineThe projected decline is mainly caused by global factors and by increased lake evaporation not balanced by river discharge or precipitation; human water withdrawals, damming and diversions often mask climate impacts.
University of Bremen (author copy)Total river inflow has declined significantly, mainly through lower Volga discharge; basin precipitation is roughly steady and evaporation shows a modest upward trend; the decline reflects compound anthropogenic and climatic influences.
CUNY Academic WorksClimate change remains the main driver of the long-term decline, together with human activities.
The Astana TimesAzerbaijan blames Russia's construction of dams on the Volga; Russia mainly blames climate change.
Baird Maritime (Reuters)No new reservoirs are being built or filled and there are no active withdrawal projects; the sea accumulates the inflow–evaporation imbalance over decades and Bolgov sees no direct link between Volga flow changes and the level.
Materia RinnovabileKozybakov: Russia's excessive Volga use disrupted the balance. Abbasov: filling of large Volga reservoirs, Russian demand, climate change, reservoir evaporation and farm expansion; the decline is not solely human-caused and level changes are long-term and cyclical.
APAReservoirs built in Russia such as Iriklinskoye keep a significant share of the water that once flowed to the Caspian, and dredging in the northern Caspian by NCOC and its contractors disrupted feeding grounds and accelerated shallowing.
The Astana TimesSeeks a joint working group with Russia and a guaranteed minimum Volga flow; Caspian Post states an inflow of 270–275 km3 a year is needed from the Volga against 207 km3 in 2023, and that the Volga supplies over 80% of the inflow.
Caspian PostTreats the Volga as not transboundary; Pritchin calls Kazakhstan's demands "excessive"; Moscow is unlikely to accept obligations beyond its federal Volga restoration project.
Materia RinnovabileAround 5 m by 2100.
University of Leeds / White Rose Research OnlineA best-fit model analysis suggests sea level reductions of about 8 m (inter-model range 2 to 15 m) under SSP245 and about 14 m (range 11 to 21 m) under SSP585 by the end of the century; Court et al. cite 8 m to 14 m under medium to high emission scenarios.
Crossref record (Springer Nature)9–18 m by the end of the century in medium to high emission scenarios.
University of Bremen (author copy)Up to 21 m by 2100 under high emissions; the paper gives 5 to 12 m and the news release 5 to 10 m even if warming stays below 2 °C; the paper says observed rates may be on track for the upper range of model predictions.
University of Leeds, School of Biological Sciences-29.21 m (Baltic system), described as alarmingly close to the historical low recorded in 1977.
Materia Rinnovabile-29.03 m average for November 2024, the lowest since 1977 (-29.18 m).
The Times of Central Asia-29.3 m average for the Kazakh sector in the first half of 2025.
The Astana TimesHow it looked
Shown
- Climate change presented as the main long-term driver of the decline, together with human activities.Kazakhstan's Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, as reported by the Astana Times · The Astana Times
- Climate change presented as the main cause of the problem.Russia, as characterised by Reuters · Baird Maritime (Reuters)
- Russian dam construction on the Volga presented as a cause.Azerbaijan, as characterised by Reuters · Baird Maritime (Reuters)
- The Volga described as not a transboundary river and not subject to international agreements.Moscow, as reported by Caspian Post (the article's characterisation, not a direct quotation) · Caspian Post
Recorded
- CASPCOM, as cited by Court et al.: 1.4 m fall over 2006–2021 and approximately 75 cm over 2022–2024.
- NASA Worldview measurement by Court et al.: water cover in a 21,901 km2 north-eastern polygon fell from 15,194 km2 in 2001 to 8,183 km2 at the end of 2024; shoreline recession 56.17 km.
- Modelled scenarios (Court et al.): a 5 m decline turns approximately 77,000 km2 into land; an 18 m decline up to 143,000 km2.
- The Baku Declaration of 18 November 2024 states the decline is driven by climatic, hydrological and anthropogenic factors and records an aim to establish a working group to identify the causes.
- Duku et al. (2026): total river inflow has declined significantly, mainly through lower Volga discharge; basin precipitation roughly steady.
- Volga discharge recently 210–232 km3 a year against a historical average about 250 km3 (Times of Central Asia, July 2025, unnamed experts).
- Kazakhstan's Deputy Minister of Ecology Mansur Oshurbayev was reported on 24 February 2026 as saying the level could approach minus 33 metres by 2050.
- No agreement between Kazakhstan and Russia on Volga flow was reported as of June 2025.
Who gained
Reached nature or the ground
Gained elsewhere
Responses on record
- Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources (Kazakhstan) (January–February 2026): Named climate change as the main long-term driver of the decline, together with human activities (Astana Times, January 2026); its Deputy Minister Mansur Oshurbayev said the level could approach minus 33 metres by 2050 (Kapital.kz, February 2026). · The Astana Times
- Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (Kazakhstan) (June 2025): Gave scenario levels of -31.8 m (moderate) and -33.7 m (severe) by 2050, as reported by the Times of Central Asia. · The Times of Central Asia
- Government of Russia (May–August 2025): Reuters reported that Russia mainly attributes the decline to climate change; Caspian Post reported that Moscow treats the Volga as not transboundary and resists new obligations; the Times of Central Asia reported that Russia's Ministry of Natural Resources is developing an adaptation programme. · Baird Maritime (Reuters)
- Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Azerbaijan (21 August 2025): Deputy Minister Rauf Hajiyev gave a fall of 0.93 m in five years and said a 5 m drop would cost seals up to 81 per cent of their breeding sites; Reuters reports that Azerbaijan blames Russian dam construction on the Volga. · Baird Maritime (Reuters)
- Federal Water Resources Agency (Rosvodresursy, Russia) (15 November 2024): RFE/RL reported that Russian officials have admitted Volga flows are manipulated, for example to support sturgeon spawning near Astrakhan; no statement of the agency on the Caspian level was found in the sources reviewed. · RFE/RL
In court and with insurers
Lawsuits and rulings
Insurers
What nature saw
Nature's report opens this page. Below: further outcomes measured on the ground.
What we don't know
Nature
Accounts
Record
- Disputed Disputed: the cause of the decline. The five Caspian states name a combination of climatic, hydrological and anthropogenic factors; Kazakhstan's Ministry of Ecology names climate change first; Azerbaijani and Kazakh voices name Russian use and reservoirs on the Volga; Russian experts name climate and evaporation. No source reviewed quantifies a split between climate and human use.
- Disputed Disputed: the present level. Figures include -29.21 m (Materia Rinnovabile, June 2025), -29.03 m for November 2024 (Times of Central Asia, reporting an Energyprom.kz review), -29.3 m for the Kazakh sector in the first half of 2025 (Astana Times) and "below 29 m" (Times of Central Asia); the datum and the area measured differ.
- Disputed Disputed: the 2100 decline. Sources give about 5 m (earlier models), 8 m to 14 m, 9 m to 18 m and up to 21 m; the figure depends on the study and the emissions scenario.
- Disputed Disputed: the increase in distance from the shore of the planned Russian port site at Lagan under the paper's decline scenarios. The paper gives a worst case of 126 km; a University of Leeds news release gives 115 km.
- None on record None on record in the sources reviewed: a quantified volume of water withdrawn from the Volga basin, or of evaporation from its reservoirs, for the years of the decline.
- None on record None on record in the sources reviewed: an agreement between Kazakhstan and Russia on Volga flow into the Caspian after June 2025.
- Not measured Not measured: whether Caspian seals can breed on land without ice. Court et al. state there are no documented cases of Caspian seal pups born on land, and that how warming and sea level reduction will interact to influence the ice regime is poorly understood.
- None on record Not itemised: the authors' statement that the economic cost of disruption could exceed tens of billions of dollars per year has no breakdown in the paper.
- Insufficient Unconfirmed: the Times of Central Asia (July 2025) reported the Caspian at its lowest recorded level, less than 29 m below sea level; the underlying measurement was not read.
Did the harm stop?
The sources reviewed show the decline continuing: Court et al. report a fall of approximately 75 cm over 2022–2024, and Kapital.kz reported in February 2026 that Kazakhstan's Deputy Minister of Ecology had said the level could approach minus 33 metres by 2050.
Who paid?
The sources reviewed give no total for the cost of the decline. Court et al. wrote that the economic cost of disruption could exceed tens of billions of dollars per year, without a breakdown. Port dredging, offshore channel dredging and state research funding are recorded in separate cases.
Sources
Press and investigations
- The Caspian Sea is drying up, and Kazakhstan asks Russia to collaborate in managing the Volga River (Riccardo Ricci)Materia Rinnovabile · 2025-06-04
- Shallowing of Caspian Sea raises alarm in Azerbaijan (Reuters, Nailia Bagirova)Baird Maritime (Reuters) · 2025-08-21
- Caspian Sea Drying Up—Kazakhstan Seeks Urgent Deal with Russia (from Kazinform and News.Az)Caspian Post · 2025-05-26
- The Caspian Sea Hits Historic Low (Vagit Ismailov)The Times of Central Asia · 2025-07-30
- How the Shallowing of the Caspian Sea Will Affect Kazakhstan's Ecology and Economy (Vagit Ismailov)The Times of Central Asia · 2025-06-09
- Caspian Sea's Decline Hits Economy, Infrastructure and Health (Laura Malikova, from Kazinform)The Astana Times · 2026-01-10
- На изучение и сохранение Каспия из резерва правительства выделено 1,1 млрд тенге (Russian)Kapital.kz · 2026-02-24
Researchers
- Rapid decline of Caspian Sea level threatens ecosystem integrity, biodiversity protection, and human infrastructure (Court et al., Communications Earth & Environment 6:261; open-access copy)University of Leeds / White Rose Research Online · 2025-04-10
- The other side of sea level change (Prange, Wilke and Wesselingh, Communications Earth & Environment 1:69, Comment)University of Bremen (author copy) · 2020-12-23
- Caspian Sea decline threatens endangered seals and coastal communities (news release)University of Leeds, School of Biological Sciences · 2025-04-10
- Climate-driven 21st century Caspian Sea level decline estimated from CMIP6 projections (Samant and Prange, Communications Earth & Environment 4:357; abstract)Crossref record (Springer Nature) · 2023-10-07
International bodies
- Declaration of the Ministers and Senior Officials of the Caspian Sea Littoral States on Strengthening Cooperation to Address the Caspian Sea Water Level DeclineTehran Convention Secretariat · 2024-11-18
Connected cases
- Kazakhstan's funding for Caspian level research and the Japan-funded UNDP monitoring initiative (2025–2026) Kazakhstan · 2025–2026 Related matter
- Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources (Kazakhstan) (Public authority) — here: States climate change is the main long-term driver; reports on the Kazakh sector; there: Presented the Interstate Programme and the UNDP-Japan initiative
- Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (Kazakhstan) (Public authority) — here: Published scenario levels to 2050 and reports inflows to the Caspian; there: Partner ministry for the UNDP-Japan initiative
- Tehran Convention, its protocols and the Caspian states' declarations on the water level decline (2003–2025) Caspian Sea (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan) · 2003–2025 Related matter
- Caspian littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan) (Government) — here: Adopted declarations on the level decline in November 2024 and November 2025; there: Parties to the Tehran Convention; adopted the declarations
- Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Azerbaijan (Government) — here: Reports a fall of 0.93 m in five years; one of its officials co-authored Court et al.; there: Co-organised the COP30 event; proposal of a working group came from Azerbaijan's President
- Caspian seal mass deaths, 2020–2025 Caspian Sea (Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) · 2020–2025 Related matter
- Caspian sturgeon and caviar: trade suspensions, fishing bans and the move to farmed caviar Caspian Sea (Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran) · 1998–2026 Related matter
- NCOC marine navigation channels to the Kashagan field, North Caspian (2021–2022) Kazakhstan · 2020–2022 Related matter
- Port and channel dredging on the Caspian after the fall in water level: Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia Kazakhstan · 2013–2026 Related matter
- Russia's forest-fire control zones and federal fire-service funding Russia · 2015–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Reserve-fund Order No. 2740-r (2026); Decree No. 382 issued by the President
- Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of Russia (Minprirody) (Government) — here: Reported to be developing an adaptation programme; there: Issued Order No. 426 (2015) and Order No. 244 (2022)
- Siberian wildfire season of 2019: Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk and Yakutia Russia · 2019
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Prime Minister ordered arson checks (1 August 2019)
- Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of Russia (Minprirody) (Government) — here: Reported to be developing an adaptation programme; there: Ordered revision of control zones (30 July 2019)
- Arctic Sunrise seizure at the Prirazlomnaya platform: ITLOS bond, PCA arbitration, 2019 settlement and ECtHR judgment Russia · 2012–2023
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Respondent; did not appear before ITLOS or the PCA tribunal; settled in 2019
- Avacha Bay marine die-off, Kamchatka, autumn 2020 Russia · 2020–2022
- Russian Academy of Sciences (Research institution) — here: Institutes whose experts Pritchin and Bolgov commented on the Volga's role; there: Researchers attributing the event to an algal bloom
- Baikal Natural Territory: expertise exemptions and clear-cutting rules Russia · 2020–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Sets the list of objects under Article 25.1(3); Deputy Prime Minister statements
- Baikal omul industrial fishing ban (from 2017) Russia · 2016–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Funded releases, hatchery and research vessel
- Baikalsk Pulp and Paper Mill: closure and waste clean-up Russia · 1966–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Decree No. 1; funded wages and clean-up; named contractors
- Baikonur launch accidents 1999–2007: Kazakh claims and the compensation agreed Kazakhstan · 1999–2007
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Respondent in the intergovernmental talks
- Baikonur lease, rocket-stage drop zones and fuel monitoring; Proton phase-out and Baiterek Kazakhstan · 1994–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Lessee of Baikonur; pays $115 million a year
- Cosmos 1408 anti-satellite test (Russia) Russia · 2021
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Conducted the test
- Degelen Mountain plutonium security operation (United States–Kazakhstan–Russia) Kazakhstan · 1996–2012
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Provided information on the site, including the 2005 disclosure
- Destruction of the Kakhovka dam and drainage of the Kakhovka reservoir (June 2023) Ukraine · 2023–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Account of responsibility; named in the claims and suspicion notices
- Drone strike on the Chornobyl New Safe Confinement, 14 February 2025, and the repair funding Ukraine · 2025–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Denied striking nuclear infrastructure
- ESPO oil pipeline rerouted away from the Baikal shore (2006) Russia · 2005–2008
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: President ordered the reroute; Prime Minister approved the route
- Hardwood logging in the Russian Far East and exports to China Russia · 2001–2023
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Officials' statements 2020 and 2023
- Ili River and Lake Balkhash: inflow from China, Kapshagay releases and a French-funded master plan Kazakhstan · 2024–2026
- Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (Kazakhstan) (Public authority) — here: Published scenario levels to 2050 and reports inflows to the Caspian; there: Manages Kapshagay releases; drafts the allocation agreement; grant recipient
- Kazakhstan's two-billion-tree programme Kazakhstan · 2020–2026
- Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources (Kazakhstan) (Public authority) — here: States climate change is the main long-term driver; reports on the Kazakh sector; there: Runs the programme; reports planting and survival figures
- Kerch Strait storm, November 2007: Volgoneft 139 fuel-oil spill and sulphur-ship sinkings Russia · 2007–2018
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Government claimants; military clean-up reported
- Khimki forest and the M11 Moscow–St Petersburg toll motorway (km 15–58) Russia · 2007–2025
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Land-transfer order; Medvedev and Ivanov statements
- Norilsk diesel spill Russia · 2020–2023
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Declared federal emergency; federal budget received the award
- Nornickel Sulphur Programme: SO2 targets, spending and measured emissions at Norilsk and Kola Russia · 2015–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Resolution No. 353 of 12 March 2022; emissions-quota experiment postponed
- Proton-M crash at Baikonur, 2 July 2013: Kazakhstan’s KZT 13.69bn damage claim against Russia Kazakhstan · 2013–2016
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Russian side in the compensation talks
- Register of Damage for Ukraine, the Claims Commission convention and the money meant to pay claims Ukraine · 2024–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Owner of immobilised central bank assets
- Russia's 1 January 2022 ban on exports of unprocessed softwood and valuable hardwood logs Russia · 2020–2025
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Issued the instruction, duties and quotas
- Russia's national carbon-unit system under Federal Law 296-FZ Russia · 2021–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Adopted Decree No. 234 of 2026
- Russian forest-climate projects: RUSAL fire-protection units and Sakhalin larch planting Russia · 2019–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Federal Law 492-FZ and reserve-account rules
- Russian Joint Implementation credits under the Kyoto Protocol, 2009–2012 Russia · 2009–2015
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Approved projects through the Designated Focal Point
- Sakhalin carbon-neutrality experiment under Federal Law 34-FZ Russia · 2022–2028
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Set the payment rate; federal law 34-FZ
- Sakhalin-2 and Sakhalin-1 in 2022: transfer decrees, the ecological-audit deduction clause and write-downs Russia · 2022–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Decree No. 416 and the orders on the stake sale
- Sakhalin-2: 2006 approval revocation, Gazprom stake purchase, 2009 damage-claim settlement and lender exits Russia · 2005–2009
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: President Putin present at the December 2006 protocol
- Sary-Shagan test range lease to Russia: rent, a 1992–1996 compensation clause and an ecological commission Kazakhstan · 1992–2016
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Lessee; treaty obligations on rent, compensation and ecological consequences
- Semey Ormany forest fire, Kazakhstan Kazakhstan · 2023–2026
- Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources (Kazakhstan) (Public authority) — here: States climate change is the main long-term driver; reports on the Kazakh sector; there: Responsible ministry; announced the damage valuation
- Smelter emissions in Kazakhstan: fines and investment pledges at Kazzinc, Kazakhmys and ERG Kazakhstan · 2020–2026
- Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources (Kazakhstan) (Public authority) — here: States climate change is the main long-term driver; reports on the Kazakh sector; there: Gave Kazzinc's share of Ust-Kamenogorsk emissions
- Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics: environmental pledges and the Mzymta valley Russia · 2007–2018
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Host government; Putin and Kozak statements
- Soviet whaling catches and the reports to the IWC, 1948–1979 Russia · 1948–1994
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Supplied original catch data to the IWC Scientific Committee in 1994
- Ukraine’s criminal proceedings over wartime environmental harm Ukraine · 2022–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: No response on record
- Usinsk pipeline spill (Komi, 1994) and the World Bank and EBRD emergency loans Russia · 1994–2004
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: Borrower of both loans; on-lent them to Komineft
- War-related greenhouse-gas emissions and Ukraine’s planned climate damage claim Ukraine · 2022–2026
- Government of Russia (Government) — here: Position: climate change main cause; Volga not transboundary (as reported); there: No response on record